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DUNS SCOTUS ON THE CONCEPT OF INFINITE BEING* 
ROBERTO HOFMEISTER PICH** 
o. Introduction 
0.1 Scotus made important attempts to formulate an acceptable ver-
sion of"infinite being'' (ens infinitum), a concept that plays a distinguished 
role in his metaphysics and natural theology 1• The intelligibility of the con-
cept, particularly in the analysis of the full compatibility of'being' and 'in-
finite', is something that he pursued especially in the proof of the existence 
ofGod 2 • Scotus usually considered these efforts no better than sophisticated 
persuasions which served to clarify that there is no incompatibility between 
entity and infinity, that there is no simple convertibility between entity and 
finity, and finally that the entity compatible with infinity in quantity is a 
fortiori also compatible with infinity "in the perfection that exists at the 
same time" 3 - i.e., with a certain kind of actual infinity in entity' 1• In his 
Quodlibet 5 (1306/1307), the Subtle Doctor seems to achieve a better result. 
There, in the analysis and construction of the concept of ens infinitum, he 
* A significant part of the research for this essay was completed during a period 
of post-doctoral studies at the University of Bonn and the Albertus-Magnus-Institut, 
Germany, which was made possible by a grant from the Alexander von Humboldt Foun-
dation. I wou.ld like to express my gratitude to these institutions for their invaluable 
support. 
'"' Pontiffcia Universidude Cat6lica do Rio Grande do Sul, Porto Aleg:re/Bra7.il. 
'"Infinite being" appea,s in Ordinatio pro!. p. 3 q. 1-3 n. 168, ed. Vat., ..:01. I, Civiias 
Vaticana 1950, p. 110-112, as the most perfect concept that the human intellect can have 
of God in the present state, i.e., of the first object of"theology as such'' (theologia in sel. 
For. this reason, it functions for Scotus as the first. subject of "(lur theology" {theologia 
nostra). 
"See especially Duns Scotus, Ordinatio l d. 2 p. 1 q. 1-2 n. 1-156, ed. Vat., vol. II, 
Civitas Vaticana, 1950. 
"For discussion of Scotus's proof via. eminentiae that the First Being in the essen-
tial order of causes is infinite, see Ordinatio Id. 2 p. 1 q. 1 n. 181-139 p. 206-210; De 
primo prin.cipio IV cone!. 9 n. 78-79, ed. W. Kluxen, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 
Darmstadt, 1974, p. 102-106. 
"See the recent and fine exp(lsition ofL. Honnefolder, Dun.s Scotus, Munchen, Beck 
Verlag, 2005, p. 91-102. Expositions of Scotus's main arguments for the infinity of the 
First Cause in the context of his proof of the existence of God are also offered by R. Cross, 
Duns Scotu.s on Gad, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2005, p. 91-114, and G. Sondag, Duns Scot. La 
meta.physique de la. sin.gularite, Vdn, Paris, 2005, p. 107-120. 
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makes use of the technique of positio impossibilis. In this paper I want to 
present and assess this later effort. 
0.2 I shall not evaluate here all of Scotus's achievements concerning 
the possibility of that concept, nor explore, for example, how "infinity" op-
erates as a mode 5 in order to coordinate all predications of God as a subject 
ofpropositions 6• My focus is on the strategy for the formation of the concept 
of ens infinitum, starting with a very briefly stated account in the Physica 
of the potential infinite according to Aristotle (I), and proceeding from there 
to develop the hypothesis that Scotus utilizes positio impossibilis in the 
"imagination" of an actual quantitative infinity (II) and in the "imagination" 
of an actual infinity in entity (III). I describe the technique in Quodlibet 5 
up to the point where it is clear or at least apparent that Scotus continues 
to employ it. I think it is possible to draw an account of the technique from 
what I call the "descriptive phase" of the argument, where infinity in entity 
- as a consequence of a positum - is treated more and more as a mode of 
being (IV- VI), I conclude with remarks on whatpositio impossibilis might 
be theoretically for Scotus, using this reading as a case study for his under• 
standing of ars obligatoria (VII). 
I. Aristotelian Potential Infinite 
1.1 At the start of Qu.odl. 5 n. [2] 5, Scotus mentions Aristotle's defi-
nition of the infinite (of the apeiron or the "unlimited") as formulated in 
Physica III 6, 207a7-9 (206b32-207al5)7. Here the infinite, understood 
under the category of quantity, is such that, no matter how much has been 
already taken, always a part outside it remains to be taken 8• The infinite 
;, Starting from the construction of the concept of ontolo1Jical infinity in Q1wdli/1et 
5, I attempt a theoretical analysis of the intrinsic mode in: R. H. Pich, Infinity and Jn. 
trinsic Mode, in: R.H. Pich (ed.). New Essays on Metaphysics as Scientia Transcendens, 
Louvain-la•Neuve, FIDEM, 2007, p. 159-214. 
"This is the thesis successfully defended by F. J. S. Catania, John Duns Scotus on 
Ens Infinitum, in: The American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 68 (1993), p. 37.54_ 
See also ,I.-M.. Counet, L'univocite de !'Hant et la problematique de l'infini chez Jean 
Duns Scot, in: ,J. Follon et J. McEvoy (eds.l, Actualite de la pensee medievale, Editions 
de l'Institut Superieur de Philosophie - Editions Peeters, Louvain-la-Neuve - Louvain-
Paris, 1994, p. 314f. 
·, For Aristotle's theory of the infinite, see A. F. Koch, apeiron / unendlich, in: 0. 
lfoffe (Hrsg. l, Arislotele8-l,exilwn, Redaktion: Rolf Geiger uncl Philipp Brtillmann, Alfred 
Kroner Verlag, Stuttgart, 2005, p. 55-58, is to be found essentially in Physica III 4-8. On 
the potential infinite, see especially Metaphysica IX 6, 1048b9-l.7, and Physica III 6, 
206a18ff. 
" See also Aristotle, Physica, translated by R. P. Hi:ffdie and R. K. Gaye, in: Aristotle, 
The Wor-1,s of'Aristotle, translated into English under the editorship ofW. D. Ross, Vol. 
II, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1970 (first edition 1930), III 6, 207a7•14: "A quan- tity is 
inffoite if' it is such that we can rilways take a part Oll-tside what ha8 been nlrecufy tahcn. 
On the other hand, what has nothing outside it is complete and whole. For thus we define 
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is not that out of which there is nothing, but :rather that out of which there 
is always something (Physica III 6, 207al-2). It should be noted that the 
point at issue for Aristotle is not to know about the existence of the infinite 
in mathematical or merely abstract things, but to judge, in a general sense, 
whether there can be actual infinite continuous magnitudes in nature; as 
is well known, Aristotle's answer is negative - see Physica III 5-W'. Follow-
ing that conception, Scotus affirms that the infinite in quantity can only be 
"in potency" (in potentia), so that in it some new thing of a corresponding 
dimension can always be taken in only after something elsew. On this view, 
whenever this is done, a new extensive "magnitude" (magnitudo) is caused 11• 
And it is a consequence of the ceaseless acceptance of some further part 
(through addition, division, or both) that the quantitative infinite is, in 
actuality, only finite - that the "magnitude infinite in extension" does not 
exist in actuali(y. In other words, such an infinite is, in actu, "a certain part 
of' the potential infinite whole" (quaedam pars totius inf'initi potentialis), 
and therefore remains something outside this same infinite that can still 
be taken into it 12• 
the whole -that from which nothing is wanting(. .. ). ( ... )-the whol.e is that of which noth-
ing is outside. On the other hand that from which something is absent and outside,(. __ J, 
is not 'all'. 'Whole' and 'complete' are either quite identical or closely rikin. Nothing is 
complete (te/eirmJ which has no end (le/os); and the end is a limit". As far as the Aristo-
telian potential infinite is concerned (Physica III 6, 206a 18), this definition oftlw iniinitC' 
is compatible with both forms of related potentiality, namely through "add1hon'' (pros/.11('-
si,~) and "division" (dihairesis); see Physica lfI 6, 206al5f. Sec also A, F. Koch, apeiron / 
unendlicl1, in: 0. Hof'fo ( Hrsg.l, op. cit., p, 57f For some of the eentral passages of 
Aristotle's Physlca concerning infinity, with short comments, see Th. Heath, JHathematics 
in Aristotle, Thoemmes Press. Bristol, 1998 (reprinted from the 194D edition I, p. 102-11:J, 
"See G. Sondag, Jean Duns Scot sur l'infini extensif et l'infini intensif, in: Revue 
Thomistc 105 (2005), p. 119; A. F. Koch, apeiron / unendlich, in: 0. I-foffo (Hrsg.), op, cit., 
p. 55-56. Sec also W. D, Ross, Commentary, in: Aristot!e,Aristotle's Physics, a revised text 
wiLh introduction and commentary by W. D. Ross, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1936 (re-
printed 19791, p. 364-36(1; R. Mondolfo, 0 infinito no pensamcnto da Antiguidade Clrissica, 
Mestre ,Jou, Sao Paulo, 1968, p. 429-461; Th. Kournmenos, Aristotle 011 klathcmatical 
lnf'ini(y, Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 1995, p. 9-34, 53-62. On the spatial-temporal 
infinity of the cosmos in today's ph_y8ics, see the rernark8 in J. Lc,slie, Finite/infinite, in: 
,J. Kim and K Sos11 leds.J, A Companion to Metaphysics, Blackwell Publisher,s, Oxford, HJ% 
ireprintecl 19981, p. J 74. See also A. W. lVIoore, Infinity, in: E. Craig (ed.l, The Routledge En-
cyclopedia of" Philosophy, Routledge, London-· New York, 1998, Vol. 4, p. 772-778. 
'" See Duns Scotus, qcrnestiones quodlibetales q. 5 n. !21 5, Ed. by F. Allunti.s, Madrid, 
1968, p. 1(37: "De primo: 'Infinitum', secundum Philosophum III Physicorum, 'est cuius 
quantitatem accipientibus, id est, quantumcumque accipiGntibus, semper aliquid restat 
accipere'; et ratio est: quia infinitum in quantitate, sicut loquitur Pbilosophus, non potest 
haben, csse nisi in potentia, accipiendo semper alterum post altcrum; (,,,)''. 
" See F, Lychetus, Comrncntarius, in: Duns Scotus, Quaestioncs q1.wdlibetales q, 
5 n. 1. Ed, by L. Wadding, vol. XII, Lyon, lGil9 lrepr. Georg OJ.ms, Hildesheim, l969l, 
P- 119: "'I ... J, scilicet accipiendo ab vna magnitudine, & addendo alteri magnitudini, qui a 
in aetu non inuenitur magnitudo infinita extensiue. Siuc L\tinn1 scmper nouarn. & nouam 
magnitudincm cau~ando & addendo semper''. 
"See Duns Scotus, (,!uaestiones quodlibctales q, 5 n, 121 5 p. lG?: "L.1: et ideo 
quanlumcurnque actipialur ill ml non est nisi Cini tum el quaedam pars totius infiniti 
potentia!is, et ideo re.stat aliquid alterum 1psius infiniti accipiendum". 
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1.2 It is important to recognize that, already in the first step of con-
structing this concept, Scotus directs the very short exposition of the Aris-
totelian account towards two notions that pertain analyticallylB to the 
concept he intends to form: after all, such a 'finite' in actuality and 'infinite' 
in potency cannot be either (i) a whole thing or (ii) a perfect thing, The con-
sequences of the Aristotelian definition, he explains, are that, on the one 
hand, the quantitative infinite according to potentiality (i') has only an esse 
in /Leri, a kind of reality that is realized "in a becoming or in a process'' 1\ 
the quantitative infinite is not able to fulfill "the concept of a whole" 
(rationem totius ), since it belongs to the definition of "whole" (totum) that 
there not be anything outside iL On the other hand, (ii') the quantitative 
infinite is also incapable of satisfying the concept of something «perfect» 
(nee est per{ectwn), since the concept of perfect is such that "the perfect is 
that to which nothing of [the corresponding! perfection is lacking'%_ 
II. Imagination of an Actual Quantitative Infinity 
II.3 In the second step of the argument, Scotus develops the concep-
tual structure of 'intensive infinity', introducing the "imagination" 
(imaginatio) of an actual quantitative infinity. In the process of 'imagina-
tion', we replace completely (commutemus) all conceivable parts of a given 
quantity infinite in potentiality (i.e., one that increases in magnitude only 
through the acceptance of a further part after the previous one) with "the 
concept of the infinite in actuality, [still] in quantity" (in rationem in/Eniti 
in actu, in quantdate), on the condition that the infinite quantity could be 
in actuality (si posset ibi esse in actu). The text makes clear that by 'imagi-
nation' Scotus is recommending the total replacement of one ratio of infi-
nite quantity with another ratio of infinite quantity. To take all possible 
infinite parts of a quantity at once in actuality should mean conceptually 
that in the new notion there is as much infinite quantity in actuality as 
"·
1 And, at least for Scotus, are not synonymous; see below under III.12 and III.14, 
1
•
1 See S, \Volf, Das potentiell Unendliche - Die aristotelische Konzeption und ihre 
rnodemen Dcriuatc, Verlag Peter Lang, Frankfurt a. M., 1983, p. 20; W. Charlton, 
Aristotle's Potential Infinites, in: L, Judson (ed. J, Aristotle's Physics - A Collection of' 
Essays, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1991, p. 129-149; L. Sweeney, Divine Infinity in Greek 
and Medieual Thought, Peter Lang, New York, 1992, p. 150f. 164•165. See Aristotle, 
Physica, translated by R P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye, op. cit., III 6, 206b16-18: "By addi-
tion then, also, there is potentially an infinite, namely, what ,ve have described as be-
ing in a sense the same as the infinite in respect llf division. For it will always be possible 
to take something ab extra". 
"'See L. Honnefelder, Scientia tra.nscendens, Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg, 1990, 
p. l lOf. See Duns Scotus, Quaestiones quodlibetctlcs q. 5 n. [21 5 p. 167: "Ex hoc concludit 
quod, sicut infinitum habet esse in fieri et in potentia in qnantitate, ita non habet 
rationem totius; quia 'totum' est cuius nihil est extra; sed extra illud infinitum, hoc est, 
extra illud quod habet esse de ipso, semrrnr est aliquid extra; nee est perfectum, quia 
perfectum est cui nihil perfectionis deest; si isti semper aliquid deest". See Aristotle, 
Physica, translated by R. P, Hardie and R K. Gaye, op. cit., III 6, 207a7-14 (sefJ note 8). 
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there is in potentiality 16, The second notion seems to correct the first in 
order to satisfy the concepts of'whole' and 'perfect'. 
11.4 At the same time, as was originally noted by G. Sondag, precisely 
at this point it should be stressed that the procedure of'imaginingm -which 
departs from the potential infinite in extension but assumes, if it were pos-
sible (si posset ), the infinite in extension as existing in actuality - resembles 
the procedure of positio impossibilis. It is today widely recognized that 
positio impossibilis is a procedure employed by Boethius in his De 
consolatione philosophiae and De hebdomadibus. The technique figures 
prominently in treatises De obligationibus of the 13th and 14th centuries, 
and William of Sherwood's Obligationes is most likely the historical source 
of Scotus's acquaintance with the logical tool18 • Emphasizing the role of the 
logical analysis of concepts in the procedure 19, I maintain, together with G. 
Sondag, that two conditions must be met in order for any use of the 'impos-
sible hypothesis' or the impossibile positum to be acceptable2n: (i) it shall not 
be contradictory in itself and (ii) the respondens in the disputation is not 
"' See Duns Scotus, Quaestiones quodlibetales q. 5 n. [2] 6 p. 168: "Ex hoc ad 
propositum; commutemus rationem infiniti in potentia in quantitate in rationem infiniti 
in actu in quantitate, si posset ibi esse in actu. Si enim nunc necessario semper crescernt 
quantitas infiniti per acceptionem partis post partem, sic et imaginaremur omnes partes 
acceptibiles esse simul acceptas vel simul remanere, haberemus infinitam quantitatem 
in actu, quia tanta esset in actu, quanta esset in potentia". 
17 In Quodl. q. 5 n. [2-4] 5-11, Scotus makes use of verbal forms of'imaginare' and 
of the noun 'imaginatio' as well. In Quodl. q. 5 n. [3] 8 he uses the expression 'secundum 
imaginationem'. The technique of reasoning secundu.m imaginationem, which will be 
connected here to that of positio impossibilis (see below), is expressly mentioned by J. 
E. Murdoch, Infinity and Continuity, in: N. Kretzmann; A. Kenny; J. Pinborg (eds.i, The 
Camb1·idge History of Later Medieval Philosophy. From the Redisco11e1'Y of'Aristotle to 
the Disintegration of Scholasticism 1100-1600, Cambridge Univfi)rsity Press, Cambridge, 
1982, p. 566-567, as an instrument of logical analysis of concepts such as omnipotence, 
absolute power, the infinite, and the continuous. 
'" See A. Vos, The Philosophy of John Duns Scotus, Edinburgh, Edinburgh Univer-
sity Press, 2006, p. 196-222. 
'" The purpose of positio impossibilis was first of all the logical training on conse-
quences proceeding in accordance with accepted rules. On the rules ofpositio as the most 
common type of obligations disputation (i.e., exercise in 'technical' norms oflogical con-
sistency), see for instance S. Knuutt.ila, Positio impossibilis in Medieval Discussions of 
the Trinity, in: C. Marmo (ed.l, Vestigia, imagines, uerba. Semiotics and Logic in Me• 
dieval Theological Texts (Xllth.-XIVth. Century), Brepols, Turnhout, 1997, p. 277-279. 
"" That is, in order to adhere correctly to the main rule of the ars obligatoria, which 
affirms that, hypothetically, "Anything can he assumed", remembering that positio 
im.possibilis is a specific view of that technique; see A. Vos, op. cit., p. 210f. See also E. 
J. Ashworth, Ralph Strode on Inconsistency in Obligational Disputations, in: K. Jacobi 
(Hrsg.), Argumentationstheorie. Scholastische Forschungen zu den logischen und 
semantischen Regeln korre!?ten Folgems, E. J. Brill, Leiden, 1993, p. 363-386 (here p. 
364--366). Updated studies on medieval obligations can be found in M. Yrjonsuuri (edJ, 
Medieual Formal Logic, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 2001; for a survey of the literature and in-
terpretations see also C. Dutilh Novaes, Medieval Obligationes as Logical Games of 
Consistency Maintenance, in: Synthese, 145:3 (2005}, p. 373-376. 
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authorized to invoke the principle that anything whatever follows from the 
impossible (ex impossibili quodlibet)~ 1• According to rules (i) and (ii), nn 
impossibile positurn expresses something logically conceivable that has no 
existence naturaliter (a hypothesis that is impossible naturahter, for ex-
ample, the idea that a quantitatively infinite continuity is a state of affairs 
that exists in actuality). And it is important to recall that rules ofpos1tio 
impossibilis, as S. I(nuuttila has stressed, were frequently used to clarify 
theological matters - such as the Trinity - and that those who employed 
them in such matters were required to admit particular hypotheses that are 
conceivable logically even when they are inconceivable or impossible doc-
trinally, insofar as they are at odds with orthodox Christian theology~'- Be 
that as it may, whatever our study concludes about the nature of positio 
techniques, it will employ the rules ofpositio impossibihs to clarify meta-
physical matters and not theological ones. As it stands, there are studies 
on Scotus's application of the ars of positio impossibilis to questions about 
the persons of the Trinity 2\ 
11.5 It is my vie\v, at least provisionally, that in this manner of trans-
ferring an analysis from the «realm of the physically possible( ... ) to the 
broader realm of the logically possible», a specific positzun helps to define 
the nature of some thing - here of an infinite being. In order to help in this 
way, the positwn must be conceivable without contradiction by means of a 
"' See G. Sondag, Jean Duns Scot sur l'infini eoxtensif et l'infini in tens if, op. cit., p. 
120 note 33; also Ch. J. i'vlartin, Impossible pos1!io as the Foundation of J\Ietaphysics or, 
Logic on the Scotist Plan?, in: C. Marmo fed.), Vestigia, imagines, verlrn. Semiotics and 
Logic in Medieval Theological Texts (Xllth.-XIVth. Ce:ntllly), Brepols, Turnhout, 1997, 
p. 258: "Scotus' account of this kind of impossible pasi:tio [referring to Duns Scot us, 
Lectura Id. 11 q. 2 n. 24, ed. Vat., vol. XVII, Civitas Vaticana, 1966, p. 136-la71 agrees 
with that given by Ockham in whose Summa logicae we find what seems to be the last 
original treatment of the principles of impossiblG positio in the middl c, age.s, ( ... ).Accord-
ing to Ockham we may admit as positwn in an impossible positio any impossibility which 
'does not entail contradictories in virtue of rules and principles per se'. That is we may 
admit any impossible proposition which docs not entail contradictories in a way which 
is 'manifestly clear to 8V8ry understanding'". There are 11ow several studies on the 
meaning of the rule 'ex impossibili sequitur quid[quodllibet' in medieval logic; see, for 
example, ,L Spruyt, Thirteenth-Century Positions on the Rule 'ex impossibili sequitur 
quidlibet', in: K Jacobi (Hrsg.), Argumentationstheorle. Scho/.astische Forsclwngen zu 
den logi.~chen und semantlschen H.cgeln lwrrehten Folgems, E. J. Brill, Leiden, 199:3, p. 
161-193. 
"' See S. Knuutt.ila, Positio im.possibihs in Medieval Discussions of the Trinity, in: 
C. Marmo (ed.), op. cit., p. 282-285; Id., How Theological Problems Influenced the De-
velopment of lVIedieval Logic'\ in: S, Caroti; R. Imbach; Z. Kaluza; G. Stabile; L. Sturlese 
(eds. I, "Ad ingenh acuitio11em '', Studies in Honour of Alfonso Maiertt. FlDEJ\1, Louvain-
ta-Neuve, 2006, p. HJ1-HJ2. For further remarb on Status's uses of obligations rules see 
also Id., Mndality as Alternativeness in ,John Duns Scotus, in: R.H. Pich led.l, New 
Essays on Metaphysics as scientia transcendens, FlDEM, Louvain-la-Ncuve, 2007, p. 
145-157. The same point is emphasized by A. Vos, op. cit .. , p. 207-210. 
"" See again Ch. J. l\lmtin, Impossible positio as the Foundation of Metaphysics or, 
Logic on the Scotist Plan?, op. cit., p. 258-261, as well a~ the references in notes 19 and 22. 
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'counterfactual' (or also 'counterpossible') analysis in which «intelligibility» 
is separated from "the idea of actualization in the real world" 2\ In the 
analysis before us, the first positum may be expressed as follows: OPll "A 
quantitatively infinite exists in actuality". This posit um basically changes 
the modal operator of the Aristotelian account of the infinite, i.e., from "Po-
tentially, there is an infinite in quantity" to "Actually, there is an infinite 
in quantity". To give a technically more precise formulation that is also con-
sonant with Scotus's reading of Aristotle, we may change the formulation 
of this first step from "It is not possible, in actuality, that there is an infi-
nite in quantity" (uerum. naturaliter) to "Actually, there is an infinite in 
quantity" (i,npossibile naturaliter positum) 25 • The logical character of this 
move from impossibility to actuality and hence possibility will be analyzed 
in the Conclusion. 
II.6 If an infinite being were to exist in actuality, then all parts of it 
,nust be simultaneously in actuality. The result of that imaginative reason-
ing, apparently possible at the conceptual level, is that all parts that were 
first actualized "in the infinite succession" (in infinita successione) and could 
only exist one after the other are now "conceived" (conceptae) to exist simul-
taneously in a.ctu. Scotus seems to certify only the result of logical analy-
sis; an actual infinite in quantity is possible to thought because it is 
non-contradictory, and it is within this process of conceiving it (which com-
bines the infinite in quantity with actual existence) that (i) whole and (ii) 
perfect are incorporated within the intended content-construction of a given 
quantitative nature X. Perhaps it is more appropriate to say that the con-
tent-construction at this point is the simple result of an exercise of logical 
compatibility between different notions and two intuitions. After all, Scotus 
combines 'infinity' or 'unlimited' quantity of parts (a mathematical idea) 
with 'simultaneity' or 'actual simultaneity', and sees no contradiction in the 
'actual infinity of quantity', so long as the notions of (i) whole and (ii) per-
fect can be viewed as contained in it. Now (i) the concept oftotum is presup-
posed in that construction, because nothing else of that quantitative being 
stays outside itself. So too (ii) the concept ofperfectum, because nothing is 
lacking in that being that could still be added to it in the category of exten-
"'See S. Knuuttila, Positio impossibilis in Medieval Discussions of the Trinity, in: 
C. Marmo (ed.), op. cit., p. 282f. In an original study, J.-L. Houdebine, Exces de lctngages 
(Holderlin, Joyce, Duns Scot, Hopkins, Cantor, Sollers), Editions Denoel, Paris, 1984, 
p. 286f. (also note 3), suggests that "through the freedom of imagination" (as opposed 
to the "inhibition of imagination"), or through a certain "capacity of conceiving", Scotus 
effects a "transposition of a purely intellectual order", namely from the "indefinite suc-
cessiveness" to the empirically non-realizable order of simultaneity of successive items, 
that is, the order of the quantitative infinite in actuality. This "intellectual imagination" 
would be shared by the discovery process of the 'transfinite' by Georg Cantor (p. 289-
317); see also below . 
. "'' I,,have coined the expressions "vernm naturaliter" and "impossibile natu.raliter 
positum. . 
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sion (quantitas) 26• From (IPl) "A quantitatively infinite exists in actuality" 
two consequents follow, namely (Cl) "Such an infinite in quantity is a whole 
thing" and (C2) "Such an infinite in quantity is a perfect thing". 
II. 7 To be sure, it would be appropriate to offer a more formalized ver-
sion of the argument. Let us call "P" the proposition "A quantitatively in-
finite exists in actuality" and "Q" the proposition "An actual infinite in 
quantity is a whole thing" (Consequent 1 above). Then we have: 
1. --.OP (ueritas naturaliter); 
2. P (positio impossibilis natu.raliter); 
3. PA-,Q (Propositum - denied because it is false; see II.2 and II.3); 
4. --.(PA-,Q) (Propositum - conceded as following from the denial of 3); 
5. --,-,Q (Propositum - conceded as following from the admission of 2, 
and the concession of 4 ); 
6. Q. 
Then, by some subjunctive conditionalization (see the expression 'si 
posset ibi esse in actu' in II.3, and the determinations in VII. Conclusion), 
we arrive at 
7. Ifit were to be that P, then it would be that Q. 
The same would obtain if we had taken "Q" as the name of the propo-
sition "An actual infinite being in quantity is a perfect thing" (Consequent 
2 above)27• 
III. Imagination of an Actual Infinity in Entity 
III.8 It is only in the third step of his argumentation (see Quodl. 5 n. 
[3] 7-8) that Scotus comes to the actual infinity "in entity" (in entitate). 
What does it mean that Scotus speaks of'entitas' here? Is doing so the same 
as to speak ofa nature such as "deity" (deitas)? The answer seems to be that 
it is an indirect way of describing a real nature (namely, 'God') and a direct 
way of determining the real and most general concept of entity - a concept 
that everyone possesses. In both cases one would investigate and eventu-
ally obtain ontological infinity, but a presumably real infinite nature such 
26 See L. Honnefelder, Scientia transcendens, p. 110. See Duns Scotus, Quaestiones 
quodlibetales q. 5 n. [21 6 p. 168: "Et omnes iliac partes, quae in infinita successione 
essent reductae in actum et haberent esse post alias, tune simul essent in actu 
conceptae; illud infinitum in actu vere esset totum, et vere perfecturn totum, quia ni-
hil sui extra; perfecturn esset, quia nihil sibi deesset, irno nihil potest addi secundum 
rationern quantitatis, quia tune posset excedin_ 
27 I have taken his simple scheme (which derives from Walter Chatton) - but not 
the general conception or the particular purpose of the positia technique - from Ch. J. 
Martin, Impossible positio as the Foundation of Metaphysics or, Logic on the Scotist 
Plan?, op. cit., p. 267-268. 
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as God can only be approached indirectly through the direct logical con-
struction of a real infinity in terms of entity. Since "entity" will be deter-
mined in Quodl. 5 n. [3-4] 7-11 through "infinity" (infinitas),just like "being" 
in Ord. Id. 2 p. 1 q. 1 n. 131-139 is determined through infinitum, here 
entitylentitas or "the character of being" of something is, just like the 
quidditative real concept of being/ens, the first transcendental - and not a 
more specific notion of either "reality" or the "intrinsic possibility" of real 
existence (as is the case in Quodl. 3 n. [2] 6-10) 28• In this sense I see the use 
of entitas in Quodl. 5 n. [2-41 5-11 as a more definite way of asking what a 
thing or a nature is on a purely transcendental level. It is the last formal-
ity obtained by t.he intellect in the analysis of knowledge - a purely deter-
minable real concept, the most general and no further definable notion, and 
also a transcendental one because it is beyond any categoric determination 
and fully compatible with all pure perfections 29• But significantly entitas/ens 
is at the same time the transcendental quid that can receive transcendental 
qualia 30 in terms of(a) 'properties of being' (passiones entis), (b) 'pure per-
fections' (perfectiones simpliciter), and (c) 'disjunct properties' or 'modes' 
(passiones disiunctae, in the sense of each determination of all transcenden-
tal disjunctions, which as disiunctiones - as disjunctive propertjes - are 
indifferently predicable of ens) 31 • As I shall try to prove - and this is why I 
offer this interpretation of the further conceptual supposition of the argu-
ment - it is implicit in Quodl. 5 n. [2-4] 5-11 that the discussion of'infinity' 
in 'entity' can only make sense if understood as a way of articulating 'being', 
its 'properties', all pure perfections, and all modes of being that imply per-
fection absolutely (being then predicable possibly of only one 'quiddity' or 
'being' like God's) 32 • Once that articulation is accomplished, then the logi-
cal constructum that shows specific transcendentals as compatible with one 
another can be ascribed as a proper real concept of a unique nature in the 
world that we call 'God'. This is not an instance of knowledge of the divine 
nature's existence but rather of the pure conceivability of the possibly most 
perfect content that metaphysics obtains ofit. 
111.9 Two observations remain to be made. First, ifwe read carefully 
the structure of the argument, (A) we begin simply with infinity as unlim-
ited continuation or separation of parts, (B) obtain then potential (math-
ematicai) infinity, and (C) correct this idea of infinity with actual infinity 
in quantity. Only actual infinity is legitimate infinity, and only an actual 
'
8 See, for instance, L. Honnefelder, Duns Scotus, p. 75f. 
"" Id. ibid., p. 56-59. See also below. 
"" I.e., determinations predicated 'in quale'. 
"' See Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I d. 3 p. 1 q. 3 n. 131, ed. Vat., vol. III, Civitas 
Vaticana, 1954, p. 81; Ordinatio I d. 8 p, 1 q. 3 n. 113-115, ed. Vat., vol. IV, Civitas 
Vat.icana, 1956, p. 205-207; De primo principio IV cone!. 3 n. 53-54 p. 64-66; Quaesti.ones 
qrwdlibetales q. 1 n. [8] 19-23 p. 14-17. 
"
2 Further in Qttaestianes quodlibetales q. 5 n. [7-12] 17-29 p. 168-182, Duns Scotus 
shows that there cannot be several beings that are distinct and for:mally infinite. 
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infinity can be an infinity in entity - whatever that might be. As a paral-
lel conclusion of the argument, we shall see that only actual infinity in 
entity can be legitimate infinity. Second, it is possible to say that Scotus 
brings further suppositions into the posz:tio. After all, ifhe has (A) the (Ar-
istotelian) supposition of unlimited continuation or separation of parts for 
infinity, which serves for quantity, he has also the ,mpposition of illimita-
tion as such - later in (2uodl. 5 n. 1.41 11, with reference to ,John Damascene, 
Scotus twice uses "intenninatum" practically as a synonym for "inftnitum'~ 1'". 
It is on account of that intuition that we have had already offered critical 
remarks on the notions of 'whole' and 'perfect'. I think that Scotus here 
realizes that he must consider the intuition of illimitation in a more gen-
eral and strict sense, and that demands a careful revision oft.he concept of 
'whole' and above all, as we shall see, of the concept of'perfocC 11_ 
III.10 Let us continue our outline of the argument. Scotus next argues, 
in a way that se2ms almost rash, that the infinite in entity must be under-
stood "proportionally" or "analogically" (proportionabiliter) to that actual 
infinity imaginatively built in the category of q1.mntity. Within such a 'pro-
portional' or 'analogical' understanding, one should think of a reality or a 
being that cannot be surpassed in entity through anything at all, and that 
will finally fulfill the requirement of analytic inclusion of the concepts of 
whole and perfecflii_ It is important to realize that, precisely because of this, 
such a proportional understanding is itself part. of the concept formation 
process secundum imagination.em. I propose that we have in this third step 
a second positum (IP2): "An infinite in entity does exist in actuality". And 
it is possible to interpret the need for revising those suppositions above as 
a consequence ofit. Here too, the starting point for the application ofpositio 
impossibilis admits a diffarent, perhaps technically more precise formula-
tion; the proposal is to replace "It is not possible, in actuality, that there is 
an infinite being" (venun naturaliter) with "Actually, there is an infinite in 
entity" (impossibile natu.raliter positum). The logical character of the move 
from impossibility to actuality remains to be analyzed (see Conclusion). 
III.11 The formation of the concept of infinite being is clearly not yet 
finished; the formal criteria of the infinite in entity can only be met if the: 
imperfection that still adheres unau01dably to the infinite in quantity is left 
"'
1 'Infinitum' and 'illimitatum' appear as synonyms al,10 in Quaestiones qrwdli-
betales q. 6 n. !61 15 pp. 210-211, where also the expression 'extensive illirnitatio' is to 
be found I.it stands in contrast there to 'intlmsive illirnitatio'). 
l-1 As 'NC notice from Physica III 6 207a8-15, Aristotll: understands 'whole' \/wloni 
and/or 'perfect' (teleionl as analytic contents of the 'infinite' (npeiron) too. 
·i,, See Duns Scotus, Quaestwnes quodlibetalcs q. 5 n. 131 n. 7 p. 168: "Ex hoc ultra: 
Si in cntibus intelligamus aliquid infinitum in entitate in actu, iliud dcbct intelligi 
propnrtionabiliter quantitati irnnginatae infinitae in actu, sic ut ens i llud dicatur infini-
tum quod non pot.est ab aliquo in entitatc cxcedi, et ipsum vere habebit ratfonem totius 
et pcrfecti". 
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behind. In other words, if the actual infinity in quantity, which includes (i) 
the concept of whole and (ii) the concept of perfect, is applied without pro• 
portionality to the idea of actual infinity in entity, 'whole' and 'perfect' 
would remain enough for infinity in quantity, however the quantitative 'per-
fect' would not be enough for infinity in entity. Although actual infinity in 
quantity is complete in this category, since it possesses all its parts in actu 
and nothing is left out of that perfect whole, each part of the quantitative 
whole stays out of each other part of the same whole and, therefore, each 
per.rt of the quantitative whole is not perfect in itself. Grounded on this de-
scription, it is possible to affirm that the quantitative whole consists always 
of parts really different from each other and that are as such limited, hence, 
imperfect' 1(;. And it seems also manifest that the sense of (ii) 'perfect' used 
to this point was that of'complete•:n, where 'completeness' can be character-
ized in such a way as to be compatible with 'limitation' (completeness in 
extension or quantitative parts) and with 'illimitation' too (necessarily then 
completeness in entity or ontological parts). 
Ill.12 By contrast, an actual infinite iri entity is something that has 
nothing of entity outside itself, because its ''totality" (totalitas) does not de-
pend on parts (ex aliquibus) that are imperfect in entity. Scotus clearly 
envisages an idea of actual infinity that can fulfill a strict concept of perfect. 
There is no doubt that a whole of specific kind or a 'whole of something', of 
quantity, of entity, etc., in order to be "a totally whole" (totaliter totum), 
cannot have any extrinsic part, and for this reason, as already indicated, 
there is a relative sense in which an actual infinite in the (mere) category 
of quantity - or a whole of quantity - is perfect too:J8• The reason seems to 
be that whatever is an actual qualified whole or an actual whole of some-
thing intrinsically limited - of numerical quantity, of quantity of matter, 
hence of numerical parts, of parts of a body, etc., - implies being, in a quali-
fied sense, perfect or even 'comp1ete' 119 in something intrinsically limited (in 
,u; See Duns Scotus, Quaestiones quodUbetales q. 5 n. 131 n. 7 p. 168: "Totius quidem, 
quia licel totum infinitum actu in quantitate nulla parte sui nee etiam parte quantitatis 
talis careret, tamen quaelibet pars esset extra aliam, et sic tot.um osset ex imperfect.is". 
"' ';Complete" is also a possible translation of the Latin "pe1fectum". 
"" See Duns Scotus, Qimestiones quadlibetciles q. 5 n. 131 n. 7 p. 168-169: "Sed ens in-
finitum in entitate sic nihil entitatis habet extra, quia nee cius totalitas dependet ex 
aliquibus imperfect.is in entitate; sic enim tot.um est quod nullam habet part.em 
extrinsecam, quia tune non esset totaliter totum; ita etiam quamvis infinitum in actu esset 
perfedum in quantitate, quia sibi secundum se totum nihil quantitatis talis deesset, 1 ... .r. 
In what concerns the Aristotelian definition of the infinite in Physica 207a7-14, see the 
remark of W. D. Ross, Commentary, op. cit., p. ::!68 : "The infinite is that of which some 
part is always beyond; that of which there is nothing beyond is complete and whole. 'Com-
plete' and 'whole' mean vei·y mtlch the same thing;(_,.)"_ See also notes 13, 34, 37. 
"" Again (see also note 87l, in relation to quantity, this seems to be a quite reason-
abl,• tram,latiun for 'perfectum'; to be complete can be an intrinsic perfection of a quan· 
titativP whole, but it cannot be an intrinsic perfoction of any part. of that same whole. 
Th is second aspect - or rather this kind of whole that would evade this very difficulty 
- seems to be what Scotus has in mind when he! thinks of a strict notion of infinity. 
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numerical parts, in parts of a body, etc.)1°, But in this case it is easy to see, 
as a consequence, that an actual quantitative infinity has intrinsic limita-
tions; whatever includes internal things/parts intrinsically limited cannot 
but be intrinsically limited too. This 'intrinsic limitation' (my expression) 
seems to be what Scot.us has in mind when he states that any part of a 
quantitative infinity lachs something regarding quantity itself, namely, 
something that would be in another part of the same whole. The respect for 
'proportionalities' - or the 'analogical' sense of the argument - in the pas-
sage from actual infinity in quantity to actual infinity in entity here effec-
tiv-ely conveys the following advice: the imperfection or the intrinsic 
limitation of each part of the actual quantitative infinite cannot. be re-
rnoved'11. And because an actual quantitative infinite or a 'whole' of quan-
tity is compatible with 'limited completeness', 'whole' and 'perfect/complete' 
are not synonymous and the 'limited completeness' of a 'whole' of quantity 
does not constitute actual infinity. 
III.13 The limitations of an account of actual infinity in quantity rec-
ognized above demand a remark on the structure of the argument. Explor-
ing it only at the beginning of the positio, Scotus nowhere explicitly denies 
the very idea of an actual infinite in quantity, That being said, it is none-
theless clear that what would make it conceivable cannot be satisfied by it 
in its own terms. Accordingly, we may think that he would propose some-
thing like the following: Let us call "P" the proposition "An infinite in quan-
tity exists in actuality" and "R" the proposition "An actual infinite is a strict 
whole and a strict perfect". Then we would have: 
I. _,,◊P (ueritas naturaliter); 
2. P (positio impossibilis naturaliter); 
3. R (Propositurn - conceded because it is true; see III.7-12); 
4. Pf'R (Propositurn -denied because it is false; see III.7-12); 
5, ---/PrR) (Propositum - conceded as following from the denial of 4); 
6. --,R (Propositum - conceded as follo,ving from the admission of 2, and 
the concessions of 3 and 4). 
"'I think that this could be easily exemplified in the "complete" series of(cardinalJ 
natural numbers in their order of magnitude (1,2,3,4,5 ... ), where each prior number does 
not contain the posterior one. Although such a series can be an example of quantitative 
infinity and illustrates the point about imperfect parts and imperfect whole, it cannot 
be an example of quantitative illimitation, since that series has no end, although it does 
have a beginning. 
·
11 See Duns Scotus, Quaestiones quodlibetales q. 5 n. 13] n. 7 p. 169: "( ... ), t.amen 
cuilibet parti eius deesset aliquid quantitatis, quae scilicet esset in altera, nee ipsum 
esset sic pei-fect:um, nisi quodlibet eius esset imperfectum". Notice here that the thotight 
of an actual infinite magnitude in extension is of interest for Scotus only insofar as he 
sees in it a necessary step for constructing the idea of an infinite nature in intensity. G. 
Sondag suggests a comparable move in B. Balzano (in his Paradoxen des U11e11dliciien), 
who requires a similar step from infinite quantity to infinite "quality"; cfr. G. Sondag, 
op, cit., 118-119, also notes 27 and 28. 
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Then, through some subjunctive conditionalization (see also the ex-
pression 'si esset possibilis' in Quodl. 5 n. [3] 8 and under III.16, as well as 
the determinations in VIL Conclusion), we would arrive at 
7. If it were to be that R, then it would be that not P. 
But the difficulty with this approach is that it would be at odds with 
the rules of the logical game 'de obligationibus'. After all, that game follows 
the deontic-logical principle that the respondens has the duty of granting 
the positum as well as granting and considering propositions that are con-
nected with it in some way (i.e., pertinens sequens, pertinens repugnans, 
indifferentes, etc.) 4~. In light of this, it seems to me that it is much easier 
and fairer to Quodl. 5 just to say that, in order to obtain the concept of in-
finite being, and for specific reasons concerning its contents (see Ill. 7-12 \, 
Scotus begins a new obligational game in (IP2) 4:i. 
III.14 Differing from an actual quantitative infinite, the infinite being 
is perfect in such a way that: something is lacking in entity neither in the 
actual infinite whole (nee sibi) nor in any part of this same whole (nee alicui 
eius), (ii*) it is perfect or 'complete' in entity, or it contains at once and ac-
tually everything of entity as such, and (ii**) the parts of its perfection or 
completeness have no intrinsic limitation. And whatever includes internal 
things/parts intrinsically unlimited cannot but be intrinsically unlimited 
too. This 'intrinsic illimitation' (again, my expression) seems to be ,vhat 
Scotus has in mind when he states that any part of an ontological infinity 
lacks nothing regarding entity as such, namely, something that would be in 
another part of the same whole' 14 • The respect for 'proportionalities', in the 
passage from actual infinity in quantity to actual infinity in entity, amounts 
to the following conceptual construction: it is possible to think of an actual 
infinite whole that is perfect or complete in that of which it is a whole (in 
entity as such), and whose parts have no intrinsic limitation in that of 
which they are parts. And ifit follows now from (IP2) "An infinite in entity 
exists in actuality", that both (Cl) "Such an infinite in entity is a whole with 
no intrinsic limitation" and (C2) "Such an infinite in entity is a perfect in 
the strictest sense", then it is clear that I have labored to make precise the 
content of the supposition of 'illimitation' or, in other words, of the suppo-
sitions 'whole' and 'perfect', because the very conceivability of Scotus's sec-
ond positio impossibilis requires this movement. 
111.15 Now, let us call "P" the proposition "An infinite in entity exists 
in actuality" and "Qi" the proposition "An actual infinite in entity is a s'trict 
whole" (Consequent 1 above). Then we have: 
'"See the references in notes 19-23 . 
. ,,, See mnre on that in VII. Conclusion . 
. ,., See Duns Scotus, Quaestiones quod/i.betales q. 5 n. [3J n. 7 p. 169: "Sed ens in-
finitum sic est perfectum, quod nee sibi nee alicui eius deest aliquid". 
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1. -,◊P (ueritas naturnliter); 
2. P (positio impossibilis naturaliter); 
3. PA-.Q 1 (Propositwn - denied because it is false; see IIl.7-14); 
4. -,(Pi\---,Q1) (Pmpositwn - conceded as following from the denial of 3); 
5, ---,---,Q 1 (Propositwn - conceded as following from the admission of 2, 
and the concession of 4); 
6. Q1, 
Then, through some Bubjunctive conditionalization (see the expression 
'si esset possibilis' in Quad!. 5 n. [318 and in III.16, as well as the determi-
nations in VIL Conclusion), we arrive at 
7. If it were to be that P, then it vrnuld be that Q 1• 
Again, the same would obtain ifwe had taken "Q/' as the name of the 
proposition "An actual infinite in entity is a strict perfect" (Consequent 2 
above). 
III.16 In order to understand Scotus's intentions in the present attempt 
at concept formation, it is crucia1 to pay attention to the summary he makes 
of the three general steps taken thus far. A final feature of the summary has 
been surprisingly neglected in the Scot11sfc;rschun.g or has at 1east gone un-
noticed: (1) the Subtle Doctor begins with the definition of the potential in-
finite according to Aristotle's Physica, (2) turns it secundwn imaginaUonem 
into the notion of actual infinity in quantity "if that were possible" (si esset 
possibilis ), and (3) finally applies it - secundwn imaginationem, we may in-
fer - to actual infinity in entity "where it is possible" (ubi est possibilis) (!) 1r,. 
Scotus changes the language of subjunctive conditional possibility in the sec-
ond step -where he showed what had to follow from (IPl), once it was conceded 
-- to language of indicative actual possibility in the third step. What is the sig-
nificance oft.his change? Ifwe look at Scotus's words, it certainly means that 
it is in terms of 'entity' or 'being' that a concept of actual infinity is ultimately 
possible and hence something positively conceivable. It is an ontological infinity 
that is ultimately a conceivable infinity, since infinity is that which fulfills 
strictly (i) the concept ohvhole and (ii) the concept of perfect, where 'strict 
whole' and 'strict perfect' mean respectively total absence ofoxtrinsic parts and 
of intrinsic limitation. And given that 'whole' and 'perfect' are the essential 
structural parts of the concept of infinity that Scotus envisages, I do think that 
important (speculative) remarks about them still need to be made. 
III.17 A (i) strict concept of whole signifies an absence of extrinsic 
parts; if some Xis a whole, then it is a reality of which it is not possible to 
See Duns Scotus, Quaeslimws quodli/Jeta!es q. 5 n, 131 n. 8 p, 169: "Sic ergo, ex 
ratione infiniti posita in III Phys/comm, 1, applicando secundum imaginationern ad 
infinilatern actua!em in quantitate, si esset possibilis. ulterius applicando ad infinitatem 
actualem in entitate, ubi est possibili.c1, ( ... )". 
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say that 'it lacks something'. However, at least as far as Scotm, is con-
cerned, 'whole' is not as such an unspecifiable concept - it is a concept and 
a term that admits or even demands complement. Moreover, when taken as 
a substantive, it is a kind of collective term as well, for it suggests 
discernable parts. So it must be said that every whole is the whole 'of some~ 
thing' and that it has some kind of'parts'. In this case, even if'actual infi-
nite whole' expresses part of the content of the concept of (ontological) 
infinite, it cannot express all of it, because (ii*) even if an actual infinite 
whole implies completeness - and also the ickia of'perfection' in terms of 
'completeness' 4'' - it does not imply as such a 'strict idea ofperfoct'; (ii*'1') the 
strict idea ofperfoct seems to imply completeness of infinite parts that have 
no intrinsic limitation. And that is the reason why the strict notion of in-
finity, the ontological infinity, obtains on1y when thought goec: beyond 
merely quantitatiue parts to 'parts' of entity - such parts are 'tha t of which' 
infinity or the actual whole now specifo:ally consists. The strict notion of 
infinity, containing ti) strict whole and (ii) strict perfr,ct, is at the same time 
synonymous with ontological infinity (infinity in entity), and it can only be 
(it is only conceivable) as ontological infinity. Because 'entity' is the only 
thing for which we can speak of perfection analytically in terms of 'com-
pleteness' (which is symmetric to 'whole of something' and 'totality of parts') 
and 'absence of intrinsic limitation' (see below), having completed steps (1) 
and (2), we conclude that ('.31 'infinity in entity' is the ve1y way of conceiving 
'actual infinity'. As I will try to show in greater detail, while 'strict whole 
of something in totality of parts' is a notion easier to conceive, 'strict per-
fect' is a more complicated notion. That its very content (thus Leu-) i.s 'intrin-
sic illimitation' or, put difforently, 'intrinsic illimitation in entity' (note: both 
expressions are my own), this is the conceptual step with v,·hich Scotus con-
cludes the first. division of this case of concept formation: through the con-
ceivable actual infinity in entity (1, 2, and :3), "we can have some sort of 
understanding [aliqualem intellectuml of how a being intensively infinite 
I.ens infinitum intensive! in perfoction [siue in perfectionel or in virtue [vel 
in uirtute] must be conceded [concedendum est]"·17, It is interesting to note 
'" See also above under II!. 12 and lil.14. See nlso note 39. 
·
17 See Duns Stotus, Quaestiones quodlihetrt/,,s q. 5 n. i,JI n. 8 p. 169: "I .. .:>, habernus 
aliqualern intel!ectum qualitcr concedendum est ens infinitum intensive, sive in 
perfectione vel rn virtute". G. Sondag, ,lean Duns Scot sur l'infini extensif et l'infini 
intensif, op. cit., p. 120, note :35, observes correctly thut Aristotle also admits, just as 
Scotus clues in the second step of his nrgumentation, that if'an lnctuall quantitative infi~ 
nite wern possible, then it would be a whole. Nevertheless, the possibility of an actual 
infinite in entity and/or of perfection of nature - the very theme of the third step of Scotus's 
nrgumentation - is definitely denied by Aristotle in Phy"irn I 2, 185/Jl-5 (in terms of an 
infinite 011sic1, of a thing/substance infinite, and in terms of an infinite pofrm, that is, of 
an infinite mode/kind or of an infinite quality). See Aristotle, Phvsica, tnmslated by R. P. 
Hardie and R. K. Gaye, op. cit., PhyHica I 2, 185b 1-5: "For lo deiirw th~ in!inite yo{1 1mrnt 
use quantity in your formula, but not substance l)l' quality. If then Being is both substance 
and quantity, it is two, not one: if only substance, it is not infinite and has no magnitude; 
for to have that it will have to be a quantity". See also ConcluHion (VII.:i?ffl. 
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that the verb 'concedo' is used here, since this is the verb used within the 
technical language of obligational games, that is, the verb indicating the 
acceptance by a respondens of what is proposed by an opponens as being a 
valid consequence derived from a positum or a positum plus a given set of 
further propositions. In the case at hand, 'concedo' expresses more specifi-
cally what must follow as affirmations of the conceivability of a positum 
such as (IP2). 
III.18 The summary above is very important for what comes next. Af-
ter all, it is a good question what should be taken as 'parts' of an actual 
infinity in entity. If we understand what numerical parts are, what are 
parts of entity? More importantly, how can such a discourse on parts avoid 
real composition through limited parts? In his first approach 48 to the idea 
of "parts" of an infinite being in Quodlibet 5, Scotus states vaguely that an 
actual infinity in entity has 'perfections' or 'virtues' as its 'parts' - more 
exactly, as its kinds of parts. Here a dissimilarity between steps (2) and (3) 
becomes more apparent: How is the 'proportionality' or 'analogy' between 
actual infinity in quantity or numerical parts to be applied to actual infin-
ity in entity? The actual infinite in quantity has numerically infinite parts. 
Scot:us does not affirm - and also does not deny- that the actual infinite in 
entity has numerically infinite parts ('perfections', 'virtues', etc.). His con-
cern seems rather to be that we now change the merely arithmetical-math-
ematical account of infinity into a notion of 'intensity': an infinite 
intensively is a being whose intensity - not number (!) - in 'entity' or 
'beingness' is infinite. In this sense, 'infinite' does not concern primarily the 
number of parts, but primarily their (degree of) intensity in entity. The 'in-
tensity', not the number, of the parts of entity and the parts capable of a 
(degree of) intensity in entity that is 'infinite' seem to be the two ideas able 
to explain intrinsic ill imitation or absence of intrinsic limitation of whole 
and parts - the perfection of the whole and of the parts. Both ideas are 
covered respectively by what I call, in the next step of the technique, a 
"modal description" (intensity at the degree of infinity) and a "quidditative 
description" (particular whole and parts) of ens infinitum. 
IV. Two Descriptions 
IV.19 It is interesting to note that, after having proposed a possible 
concept (ratio, intellectus) of actual infinity in entity or of an infinite being 
in entity 4u, Scotus states in Qu.odl. 5 n. [4] 9 that he is now able to offer a 
description of that reality, and he offers it iii two different moments ("ex 
hoc, possumus ens 'infinitum in entitate', sic describere ... "; "Potest etiam 
·•• The second approach t.o the idea of parts of an infinite being is briefly examined 
below under "IV. Two Descriptions", namely in IV.27 and IV.28. 
''" "Actual infinity in entity~ and "infinite being in entity" are just the same concept, 
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describi ... "). Ifwe understand steps (1), (2), and (3) above as ways of estab-
lishing or constructing a complex concept (actual infinity in entity) in terms 
of strict conceivability of its contents (whole with no intrinsic limitation and 
a perfect thing in the strictest sense)- so that we propose them as its ana-
lytic contents and, in a sense, the structure or the necessary and sufficient 
conditions of its definition - how should a "description" be understood? I 
think it should be understood as (a) a more determinate way of providing 
component (quidditative) contents to such a reality and concept, and as (b) 
a more descriptive way of specifying the modal aspect of those component 
(quidditative) contents. In the end, we shall see that the content of"actual 
infinity in entity" or "actual infinite in entity" - whose structure of conceiv-
ability was offered in (1), (2), and (3) - is the result of combining what I 
shall call (I) "quidditative description'>50 and (II) "modal description". Ifit 
should be asked in what sense this descriptive phase of the argument is 
related to the positio impossibilis phase of it, I suggest that in this case once 
again the first phase provides the structural steps for the conceivability of 
the intended concept oft.he ontological infinite, and the second phase oper-
ates with the very contents that can satisfy those structural steps, as well 
as with the right idea of their "dimension". In this sense, "structural conceiv-
ability" and "contents and modes of conceivability" respectively belong al-
together to the general strategy of concept formation. 
IV.20 In the (I) "quidditative description", the "being infinite in entity" 
is described "as a being that lacks no entity in the way that one single be-
ing is able to possess it [i.e., the totality of entity]". Surely this definition 
reminds us of the construction of the concept of infinite being in terms of 
strict whole and strict perfect. But Scot.us adds clearly the clause "in the 
way ... is able to" (eo modo quo possibile est), that is, a clause of possibility 
for a single being to possess entity as a whole; presumably there is a way 
in which this is possible and conceivable, since such a single being cannot 
possess "in itself' (in se), "really and formally'' (realiter et formaliter), "every 
entity whatsoever" (omnem entitatem) "through identity" (per identitatem) 51• 
A short exploration of this subject will show that Scotus confirms here 
what, in terms of quidditative content, actual infinity, as strict whole and 
strict perfect in entity, is supposed to be. This seems to mean that such a 
"" I am using "quidditative" because of the use of'quiditas' for essence and also for 
a formally distinguished content that belongs to an essence on the basis of what the es-
sence is in respect of its mode; the expression "essential description" would work as well. 
Concerning what belongs or expresses formally the properties of the divine essence 
Scotus uses 'quiditas' for perfectiones simpliciter in Ordinatio I d. 8 p. 1 q. 4 n. 220 p. 
275. Of course, the expression "quidditative" here does not concern the discussion of the 
nature and predicative character of transcendentals called 'perfectiones simpliciter'. 
Surely perfections called 'quiditates' do not express formally the divine essence. 
"
1 See Duns Scotus, Quaestiones quodlibetales q. 5 n. [4] 9 p. 169: "Ex hoc, possu-
mus ens 'infinitum in entitate', sic describere, quod 'ipsum est cui nihil entitatis deest, 
eo modo quo possibile est illud haberi in aliquo uno'; et hoc pro tanto additur, quia non 
potest in se realiter et formaliter per identitatem omnem entitatem habere". 
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being or nature - which human intellect does not know as such - according 
to the whole and to the perfect both possesses only what is strictly of onto-
logical perfection (quidditatively, that which has no intrinsic limitation) and 
properties and perfections as well that allow some kind of real and formal 
distinction - or, using the official expression for such a distinction, some 
"formal non-identity based on the real thing" 52• At the same time, it seems 
correct to affirm that the concepts of'whole' (of actual totality of parts) and 
of'perfect' (what lacks nothi,1g as such), belonging analytically to the con-
cept of the actual infinite that is hence structurally conceivable as perfect 
whole, are describable in ontological terms so long as they concern 'entity', 
namely not 'every entity', but fundamentally that 'entity' and further 
quidditative aspects of entity with no intrinsic li,nitation that can be pos-
sessed by a single being. Accordingly, within the first approach to the no-
tion of "parts" of a perfect whole or an actual infinity in entity, we shall 
exclude from it any nature and any properties that in their full conception 5:1 
contain the notion of finitude, such as "human being", "rational animal", 
"laughable", "dog", "three", "stone", etc. And we must definitely include in 
such an essence, through real identity, all "pure perfections" (pe1fectiones 
simpliciter)r.' 1, comprising as well all divine attributes - i.e., attributes ex-
clusive of God - under the expression "divine perfections" (perfectiones 
diuinae )55• The fa.ct that every pure perfection is compatible with the divine/ 
infinite essence through real identity and stays in conformity with its sim-
"See Duns Scotus, Ordinatio Id. 2 p. 2, q. 1-4 n. 390. 404 p. 350. 357. As is well 
known, both real identity and formal non-identity a parte 1·ei are "real" independently 
of the intellect. X and Y would be fonually identical iff either X were part of the formal 
reason of Y, or Y were part of the formal reason of X. Where this is not the case, and X 
and Y are really the same, X and Y are formally non-identical. 
"" The one that includes essential aspect plus the intdnsic mode of it according to 
the pn:ma divisio "infinite"-"finite"; see L. Honnefelder, Duns Scotus, p. 88-94; R. Cross, 
Duns Scotus on God, p. 114; Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I d. 8 p. 1 q. 2 n. 32·38 p . .165-168. 
On the concept of an essence plus its intrinsic mode as a "co12ceptus per se" see Duns 
Scotus, Ordinatio I d. 3 p. 1 q. 1-2 n. 58 p. 40. 
''' Cfr. Duns Scotus, Quaestiones Quodlibetales q. 1 n. 141 8-10 pp. 9-10. Cfr. also 
G. Sondag, Jean de Damas et Jean Duns Scot sur !'infinite de !'essence divine, in: Chora 
- RrJuue d;Etudcs Ancie12nes et M<frlirJvales, 3-4 {2005-2006), p. 314-315. The following aro 
certainly sufficient characterizations of pure perfections such as "wisdom", "goodness", 
"life", etc.: they are defined in contrast to the positive thing with which they are incom-
patible; they make their possessor better absolutely speaking; they are compossible with 
one another; each of them is irreducibly simple; each of them is incompatible with finity 
as such; they are all equally perfect; none of them is formally incommunicable; they are 
all transcende;1tals; they apply to things independently of their types; they are not sim-
ply coextensive with being; they are not simply proper to God alone. Cfr. J. Seifert, A 
Vontade como perfeii;:ao pura e a nova concepr;ao nao-eudaimonfstica do amor segundo 
Duns Scotus, in: Veritas 50:3 (2005), p. 51-78. 
""See Duns Scotus, Quaestiones quodlibetales q. 5 n. 124-251 55 p. 196: "Et cum ad-
ditur quod inflnitas intellectus est propter identitatem eius ad essentiam, respondeo: 
primum omnino in divinis, ut tactum est in prima quaestione, est essentia ut essentia, 
quae, secundum Damascenum, est pelagus propter comprehensionem omnium perfec-
tionum divinarum; ista est infinita non tantum intensive in se, sed etiam virtualiter 
plicity can be seen in the finely worked out definition of the perf(!ctiones in 
(luocll. 5 n. 11 :1-141 :30-:32, where Scotus even calls the "infinite-, intensively" 
(infindwn intensive) "a pure perfection""" because of its absolute illimita-
tion. This seems to be the sense in which such a being does not possess "in 
itseH'', "really and forma11y" through .some "identity", "every entity what-
soever". It can possess 'in itself really through identity - even if fonnally 
with no identity - quidditative aspects of entity rult// no intrinsic limita~ 
tion" 7• And precisely those contents that can fulfil this description are then 
the quidditative contents - contents relative to 'entity' - of the infinite be-
ing that have to be exan1ined and incorporated into the process of concept 
fi:irmationr,k. Scotus is presumably saying that several quidditat:ive contents 
cannot ever be assumed as belonging to the infinite being or nature. There-
fore, from (IP2) "An infinite in entity exists in actuality" (or, assuming what 
was concluded before in (Cl) and (C2), "A perfect whole of being exists") it 
follows (C:3) "There is a nature that, together with its essential aspects or 
perfections really identical and formally different, has no intrinsic limita-
tion, and it can be possessed by a single being". 
IV.21 Let us call "P" the proposition "An infinite in entity exists in 
actuality" and "Q;i" the proposition ''There is a nature that, together with 
its essential aspects or perfections really identical and formally different, 
has no intrinsic limitation, and it can be possessed by a single being" (Con-
sequent 3 above). Then we have: 
1. ~aOP (veritas naturaliter); 
2. P (positio impossibilis naturaliter); 
3. PA--,Q, (Propositum - denied because it is false; see III.6, III.14, and 
IV.20); 
4. --,(PA~,_,,Q3 ) (Propositwn - conceded as following from the denial of3); 
primo et per se contlnens omnia intrinseca; \ ... )". See also Duns Scotus, De pn:mo 
principio IV cone!. 3 n. 53 p. 64: "TERT!A CONCLUS!O: Ornnis perfectw simp/iciter, et in 
sumnw, inest necessario naturae summae. Perfoctio simpliciter dicitur quae in quolibet 
est melius ipsum quam non ipsum". 
,,,; See Duns Scotus, Quaestiones quod/ibetales q. 5 n. [131 30 p. 182: "Omnis 
perfectio simpliciter est cornmunicabilis; omne infinitum intensive est perfectio simplic-
iter; ergo etc.". See id ibid., n. 1131 31 p. 183: "Probatio maioris primae; C-tuia secundum 
quod colligitur ex intentione Anselmi, Monologio 15, perfoctio simpliciter est quae in 
quolibet hnbente ipsarn melius est ipsam habere, quam non-ipsam habere": ibid: "( .. .l; 
sed inte!ligitur ibi 'non-ipsum' pro quocumque sibi incompossibili etiam positive, ut sit 
scnsus: perfectio sirnpliciter est in quo!ibet. melior quocumque sibi incompossibili". 
,., Surely Scot.us is conscious in Quod/ibet 5, as he is in 01·dinatio I d. 8 p. 1 q. 1-2 
n. 1-38 p. 153-168, that real distinction of attributes in an entity or essence implies rnm-
poHition. and composition implies limitation, viz. potentiality. In this sense, one can ar-
guably infer that "infinity" explains real and essential "simplicity"; s(ie the excellent 
account of simplicity in R. Cross, Duns Scotus on God, p. 9H-114, 112-11:J !Chapter G: 
"Divine Simplicity"). 
'" Even if Scotus does not develop the issue here, I think that such contents must 
be thought of in terms of pure perfections. 
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5. -,-,Q 3 (Propositum - conceded as following from the admission of 2, 
and the concession of 4); 
6. Q3. 
Then, by strict (necessary) implication (see the expression 'ubi est 
possibilis' in Quodl. 5 n. [3] 8 and under IIL 16, as well as the determina-
tions in VII. Conclusion), we arrive at 
7. If it is that P, then it is that Q3. 
IV.22 In the (II) "modal description", Scotus, even ifhe does not use 
the expression, actually begins the analysis of the infinite in terms of the 
"transfinite", a term that seems to signify "that which is beyond all finite, 
however great this may be" 59 • In this description "through excess" (per 
excessum), the being infinite in entity is that "which exceeds any finite be-
ing whatsoever not according to some limited degree [determinatam 
proportionem] but [in a degree] beyond every determinate or determinable 
degree" 60 • I assume that Scotus "describes" further - as specified in IV.19 
- a being that is infinite in entity, i.e., in its character of being or nature. 
Now ontological infinity is described firstly in terms of «proportion» or «de-
gree» (proportio)- once again not in terms of number in 'entity'. It seems 
right to say that ontological infinity is described in terms of"proportion" or 
"degree" (proportio) of"intensity" (intensio) 61 in "entity" (entitas). Scotus ex-
511 See G. Sondag, Jean Duns Scot sur l'infini extensif et J'infini intensif, op. cit., p. 
116 (115-121!. A comparison between Scotus's "infinite" and G. Cantor's "transfinite" 
in mathematics is beyond the scope of this essay. See on this J.P. de Tudela y Velasco, 
ldentidad, forma y dif'erencia en la obm de Juan Duns Scoto. Una aproximaci6n. 
matemdtica al pmblema de su inte111retaci6n, Editorial de la Universidad Complutense, 
Madrid, 1981, p. 117-150. On transfinite methods and actual infinity in the philosophy 
of mathematics, see the remarks in S. Korner, The Philosophy of Mathematics, Dover 
Publications, New York, 1986 (republication of the second edition, 1968), p. 60ff., 111.ff. 
"" See Duns Scotus, Quaestianes quodlibetales q. 5 n. 14] 9 p. 169: "Potest etiam 
describi per excessum ad quodcumque aliud ens finitum sic: 'Ens infinitum est quod 
excedit quodcumque ens finitum, non secundum aliquam determinatam proportionem, 
sed ultra determinatam proportionem vel determinabilem' ". See also Duns Scotus, 
Or·dinatio I d. 2 p. 1 q. 1-2 n. 132 p. 206-207: "Minor probatur, quia infinitum non 
repugnat enti; sed omni finito maius est infinitum. Ad istud aliter arguitur, et est idem: 
cui non repugnat infinitum esse intensive, illud non est summe perfectum nisi sit infini-
tum, quia si est finitum potest excedi vel excelli, quia infinitum esse sibi non repugnat; 
enti non repugnat infinitas; ergo perfectissimum ens est infinitum". The Scotist defini-
tion will have strong influence on the "infinitists" of the 14~'-century, which, similarly, 
would try to construct a non-Aristotelian concept of the actual infinite magnitude (John 
ofBassolis, Francis ofMayronis and, above all, Gregory ofRiminD. See G. Sondag, Jean 
Duns Scot sur l'infin i extensif et l'infini intensif, op. cit., p. 116-117. 
61 The noun 'int.imsio' does not appear in Quodl. 5 n. [2-41 5-11, but rather 'infinitas 
intensiva' or 'infinitum intensive', where 'intensive' (see Quodl. 5 n. {4] 10) is clearly an 
adverb. On the use of'intensio' see note 78. In any case, it is fair to say that 'infinitas' 
of 'entitas' or ontological infinity for Scotus can be analogically "measured" by a scale 
of intensity - entity can be analogically measured by a scale of intensity - and that in-
tensity is able to admit a kind of degree. Scotus is searching for a language that is able 
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plains here his basic thesis that the being that is actually infinite - that is 
analytically a strict whole and a strict perfect in entity - is or has intensive 
infinity; infinity is an intensity of entity, namely, in that being that is a strict 
whole and a strict perfect in entity. This way of considering infinity is the 
only way to make sense of the idea of actual infinity, hence of ontological 
actual infinity. So from (IP2) "An infinite in entity exists in actuality", (or 
assuming what was obtained in (Cl), (C2), and (C3), "A perfect whole of 
being, with no intrinsic limitation, exists"), follows (C4) "There is a being 
whose degree of intensity in entity is infinite or whose intensity in entity 
is infinity". 
IV.23 Let us call "P" the proposition "An infinite in entity exists in 
actuality" and "Q/' the proposition "There is a being whose degree ofinten-
sity in entity is infinite or whose intensity in entity is infinity" (Consequent 
4 above). Then we have: 
1. ,◊P (ueritas naturaliter); 
2. P (positio impossibilis naturaliter); 
3. PA,Q. 1 (Propositum - denied because it is false; see III.6, III.14, and 
IV.20-22); 
4 . .,(PA,Q 4) (Propositum - conceded as following from the denial of3); 
5. __,_,..,Q4 (Proppsitum - conceded as following from the admission of 2, 
and the concession of 4); 
6, QJ, 
Then, by strict (necessary) implication, we arrive at 
7, If it is that P, then it is that Q4 • 
IV.24 In Quodl. 5 n. [2-4] 5-11, to propose and to concede consequents 
following from a positwn means to think about the contents or necessary 
and sufficient (dcfinitory) conditions of the positwn or concept put forward, 
and in so doing, to substantiate that it is conceivable. Having conceded (C4), 
Scotus explores further the treatment of infinity as an intensity of entity, 
and does so through the famous example of"whiteness" (albedo)"i_ "White-
ness" is a form of being- an accidental one - and admits of intensity in en-
tity6·1. Surely its degree of intensity in entity is basically 'finity' or basically 
to express ontological infinity; since 'infinity' bears originally a quantitative sense, when 
applied to 'entity'; the quantitative sense is modified to a quantitative category proper 
to natures, and transcendental concepts such as 'being' and 'perfections'. 
,;a Scotus's metaphysical use of the modal distinction - of "infinitum"/"finitum" -
as well as his account of intensive magnitude, were surely inspired by the treatment of 
modal distinction "in cases of the intensification and remission of forms L.J, where some 
qualitative feature admits continuous variation along a given range: the intensity of 
color, the amount of heat, the strength of desire,(. . .)"; see P. King, Scot us on Metaphys-
ics, in: Th. Williams {ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scot us, CUP, Cambridge, 
2003, p. 25-26. 32-33. 
"'
1 Again, the notion of "whiteness" together with its "intrinsic mode" or "intensity" 
form a conceptus per se; see Duns Scotus, O,·dinatio Id. 3 p. 1 q. 1-2 n. 58 p. 40. · 
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determined by it, but even under this fundamental disjunct property or 
mode, a form of being, compared to other forms, allows quite definite differ• 
ences in degree/proportion. Scotus states that "whiteness", for example, is 
exceeded in degree/proportion of {intensity in) entity in these ways: 'triply' 
(in triplo) by another entity such as "strict knowledge" (scientia); 'ten times' 
(in decuplo) by the "intellective soul" (anilna intellectiua); 'a hundredfold 
times' (in centu.plo) "by the most perfi:,ct angel" (a supremo angelo). All these 
beings are finite and located within a supposed hierarchy of proportion/ 
degree of (intensity in) entity; in all these cases finite beings can be com-
pared in respect of their proportion/degree of (intensity in) entity, and it is 
always possible to give the "determinate measure" (proportio cletermi.nata) 
according to which the 'highest being' (supremum) - "the most perfect an-
gel" - exceeds the lowest one; such a determinate measure is always finite 61 . 
IV.25 We have to understand intensities, for infinity is an intensity. 
Finity is also an intensity. Intensities are measurable; they appear in de-
grees/proportions, and as a kind of quantity they "can be w,ed to 'measure' 
differences betvieen things"';,,_ Therefore, Scotus spends time explaining 
degrees/proportions of intensrties, beginning with the intensity called 
'finity'. He clarifies that among finite beings, in respect of their comparison, 
there is no ''proportion [degree of intensity in entity] properly speaking'' 
(pmprie proportio) - that is, there is no proportion in the mathematical 
sense, e.g., three, ten, or hundred times, etc .. Talk of proportions in this 
context is thus an analogical way of speaking of a hierarchy among beings 
concerning their intensity in entity, and here "three, ten, hundred tinrns, 
etc.", are arbitrary classifications. Taking the angel itself - the supreme 
being in the hierarchy - Scotus asserts that, being simpler, it is not consti-
tuted by some lesser entity to which something has been added in the sense 
that it gets "more entity" in terms of"more [extensive/additive! quantity of 
entit_y''. Degrees or proportions of (intensity in) entity, and also the differ-
ences in degree or proportion of (intensity in) entity among finite beings, 
"' See Duns Scotus, Quaestiones quodlibetale8 q. 5 n. 14] 9 p. 169: "Verbi gratia, 
accipiatur haec entitas 'albedo'; exct:ditur ab alia entitate, quae est scientia, in triplo; 
itcnnn exceditur ab ani nm intellectiva in clecuplo; iterum a supremo angelo esto quod 
in centuplo; qualitercumque procedis in entibus, semper esset dare in qua proportione 
determinata supremum exceclit infimum; (...)". 
"'' See F. Alluntis and A. B. Wolter, Translation, Introduction, Notes, and G!os,,ary, 
rn: ,John Duns Scotus, God and the Creatures-~ The Quodlihe'tal QueHtions, Princelnn 
University Press, Princeton - London, H)75, p, 110-ll 1 note ,1: One sense of quantity 
"'is the strictly proper sense used by the mathematician or physicist,,.. 1 which exisLs be~ 
tween what contemporary philosophe1·s would call extensiue or cidditiue properties like 
weight, length, time intervals., electric current, etc. The other is analogous to that which 
holds between intensive or 1wn-add1tille differences where these eanbe arranged seri-
ally. We can grade students, for instance, according to intelligence, mastery of a isivcn 
subject matter, alertness, etc. Numbers can then be assignee! to variorn; groups. Tlws 
two in the same percentile may be said to be equal, whereas i.lwse in different percen-
tiles are said to be either better or worse; than the others. Yet the 'degree ofdiffen:ncc' 
is not an exact mathematical one". · 
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must be understood in terms of the proportion/degree of"power or perfec-
tion" (secundum proportionem virtutis et perfectionis), in the sense that 
there is "superiority" (excessus) in power or perfection among different 
species, according to what they are 66 • This seems to 111ean that the exist-
ence of different proportions/degrees (of intensity) in entity indicates in-
feriority or superiority in po,ver or perfection among finite beings~ of an 
intensity in power or perfection that is, in an analogical and mathemati-
cally not exact sense, measurable. But the way that a being infinite in 
entity exists is described through a contrast: a being infinite in entity 
exceeds a being finite in entity (in enhtate finitum) beyond every measure 
that can be assigned (assignabilem)" 1 , Infinity is an intensity in entity 
that is not finitely measurable, i.e., whose degree of intensity in entity is 
'beyond any determinate and determinable measure'. Having incorporated 
the language of "degrees" and "proportionalities" among beings into the 
discourse, it follows now from (IP2) "An infinite in entity exists in actu-
ality", (or assuming what was obtained in (Cl), (C2), (C3), and (C4), "A 
perfect whole of being, with no intrinsic limitation and whose intensity in 
entity is infinity, exists"), that (C5) "There is a being whose degree of in-
tensity in entity is beyond any determinate or determinable degree of 
intensity in entity among finite beings". 
IV.26 Let us call "P" the proposition "An infinite in entity exists in 
actuality" and "Q,," the proposition "There is a being whose degree ofinten-
sity in entity is beyond any determinate or determinable degree of inten-
sity in entity among finite beings" (Consequent 5 above). Then we have: 
1. -·s◊P (uen'.tas naturaliter); 
2. P (positio impossibilis naturaliter); 
3. PA-,Q., (Propositu.m - denied because it is false; see nu:;, III.14, and 
IV.20-25); 
4. ~(P,,-,Q.,) (Propositwn - conceded as following from the denial of 3); 
5. -,-,Qr; (Propositwn - conceded as following from the admission of 2, 
and the concession of 4); 
6, Q;;. 
Then, by strict (necessary) implication, we arrive at 
7. If it is that P, then it is that Q5 . 
IV.27 As noted above, we confine our analysis to the account of in-
finite being offered in Quodlibet 5. To be sure, there are other sections of 
"" See Quaestione~ quocllibeta.les q. 5 n. [4] 9 p. 170: "L .. ); non quod ibi sit proprie 
proportio taiis quali utuntur mathematici, quia non constat angel us ex aliquo inforiori 
cum aliquo addito, cum sit simplicior, sed intelligendum est hoc secundum proportionem 
virtutis et perfectionis, sicut est excessus in speciebus". Here, essences or forms are dif~ 
foront things measurable by nn mtensiue or 1wrHrdditive quantity: finity and its degrees, 
See Qua.esliones quodlibetales q. fin. 141 9 p, 170: "Hoc modo, per oppositionem, 
mfinitum excedit in entitate finitum ultra omnem proportionem assignabilem". 
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the text which inspire reflection on the exposition above concerning the 
distance between the infinite in intensity of entity and the finite in inten-
sity of entity as a different articulation of how the actual infinite in entity 
is a "whole". In Quad!. 5 n. [25-26] 55. 57, Scotus compares the different 
proportions, and hence, the different intensities in entity in a way that 
models the comparison of whole and parts, where the whole is not the 
"quiddity", and the parts are not "attributes" or "pure perfections" - the 
"whole" is rather the divine infinite entity, and the "parts" contained in 
it are, in a special sense, the creatures. Scotus does not bring this account 
of whole and parts into his construction of a philosophical concept of in-
finite being. At any rate, the step from (IP2) to (C5) can be viewed as a 
way of broadening the meaning of ens infinitum in terms of a whole that 
contains as parts "the totality of entity", where parts are all created be-
ings in a hierarchy such as the one just mentioned (IV.24). Surely the 
containment of the parts by the whole here is through virtuality(i 8 and 
eminence, just as God's intellect contains and grounds "originally" 
(principiative) all ideas that are in themselves formally possib1e 69 and, by 
originating them, contains in a supreme way all perfections that they 
have (including pure perfections). Perhaps the reason for not including 
explicitly this second consideration of whole/parts in the positio is con-
nected with the fact that it is a theological-metaphysical speculation, and 
as such does not add anything to the quidditative and modal accounts of 
the divine being infinite in its essence. Scotus affirms in Quodl. 5 n. (24-
25) 55 that the essence of God, as an "ocean" (pelagus ), contains all per-
fections; that is, it contains in the most perfect way every "intrinsic entity" 
(entitatem intrinsecam) that is possible for a single being formally to con-
tain. All things, and not just divine "attributes'' and/or "pure perfections", 
"emanate" (emanant) from the First Entity in a determinate order - (i) 
first, "intrinsic essential things" ( intrinseca essentialia), which express no 
external relations; (ii) second, the notional or personal properties 
(notionalia) in real but not formal identity; (iii) third, "created or extrin-
sic things" (creata siue extrinseca) not in real and/or formal identity. Each 
thing that emanates from the first essence receives from it the perfection 
of which it is capable (as long as the perfection is not incompatible with 
itself), and the effective cause of what is received by creatures is the in-
"" There are contexts where Scotus explicitly says that the divine essence contains 
"virtually" the notional or personal properties, such as "paternity", where two distinct 
formalities - "deity" and "paternity" - "in one and the same really identical thing" are 
such that one of them contains virtually the other; see F. ALLUNTIS and A. B. Wolter, 
Glossary: uirtually, in: John Duns Scotus, God and the Cr-eatures - The Q11odlibetal 
Questions, Princeton University Press, Princeton - London, 1975, p. 538; see also Duns 
Scotus, Lectura Id. 2 q, 1-4 n. 272, ed. Vat., vol. XVI, Civitas Vaticana, 1960, p. 215. But 
in Quodlibet 5 Scotus clearly denies that there are formal criteria for calling the notional 
property of paternity a "part" of the "whole" or the divine essence. 
11
" See Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I d. 36 q. un. n. 26-66, ed. Vat., vol. VI, Civitas 
Vaticana, 1963, p, 281-298. 
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finity of the divine intellect 70; the divine essence thus contains the total-
ity of entity, although not in each case in the same way 71• 
IV.28 The second model for the relationship of whole and parts finds 
fullest expression in Scotus's answer to the main argument of Quodl. 5 n. 
3, which maintains that "the relation of origin [paternity] is formally infi 0 
nite". Scotus states in Quodl. 5 n. [26] 57 that infinity in entity is "totality 
in entity" (totalitatem in entitate), while finity is "partiality of entity" 
(partialitatem entitatis). Since the finite as such is "less" (minus) than the 
infinite, Scotus invokes Euclid's Elements to support the claim that the 
"smaller number" (numerus minor) is a part or parts of the larger one72• 
This account of parts oflarger numbers - parts and wholes in mathemati-
cal quantity - is analogous to the relation between finite beings and infinite 
being. Accordingly, no created being is a real or formal part of the essence 
of God, since God is most simple; nonetheless, every finite being or being 
that is really different from God, since it is less than the infinite entity, can 
be called a "part": it can be so called not in a determinate proportion, since 
it is exceeded ad infinitum by the divine essence, but in the sense that it is 
a being "through participation" (per participationem). After all, through 
participation a created being captures a part of the entity that in God is "to-
tally and perfectly" (totaliter et perfecte)73 , Indeed every finite being, because 
it is "less than" the infinite being, is a "part"; "to be less than something'' 
thus belongs to the meaning of "part". Since it is incompatible with divin-
ity to be part or be really exceeded by anything, finity is incompatible with 
it. In this sense, "paternity" (pa.,ternitas), as a notional property, is no part 
of the divine essence, because it is incompatible with it to be really exceeded 
70 See Duns Scotus, Quaestiones quodlibetales q. 5 n. [24-25] 55 p. 196: "Et cum ad-
ditur quod infinitas intellectus est propter identitatem eius ad essentiam, (25] respon-
deo: primum omnino in divinis, ut tactum est in prima quaestione, est essentia ut 
essentia, (. .. )". 
11 See Duns Scotus, Quaestiones quodlibetales q. 5 n. [25] 55 p. 196-197: "Videtur 
ergo quod essentia habet infinitatem et formaliter et propriam et primam quia a se; quia 
respectu omnium dicitur pelagus, quia omnem perfectissime continet entitatem 
intrinsecam, ut possibile est earn contineri in uno formaliter. Ab hac autem prima, sicut 
Hcet loqui, emanant omnia ordinate; primo quidem intrinseca essentialia, quae non 
dicunt respectum ad extra; Secundo, notionalia; tertio et ultimo, creata sive extrinseca; 
et quodlibet emanans recipit illud perfectionis ab ea cuius est capax, si sibi non 
repugnat; et illius recepti causa quasi effectiva et primaria est infinitas essentiae, ( ... )". 
7
~ See Duns Scotus, Quaestiones quodlibetales q. 5 n. [26] 57 p. 198-199: "Sicut 
declaratum est in primo articulo, infinitas in entitate dic:it totalitatem in entitate, et per 
oppositum suo modo finitas dicit partialitatem entitatis; omne enim finitum ut tale 
minus est infinito ut tali; quia, secundum Euclidem, VII conclusione 4: 'Omnis numerus 
minor maioris numeri pars est, vel partes' ". 
73 See Duns Scotus, Quaestiones quodlibetales q. 5 n. [26] 57 p. 199: "Nullum 
creatum est pars Dei, cum Deus sit simplicissimus, sed omne finitum, cum sit minus illa 
entitate infinita, conformiter potest dici pars, licet non sit secundum aliquam 
proportionem determinatam, quia exceditur in infinitum; et hoc modo omne aliud ens 
ab ente infinito dicitur ens per participationem, quia capit partem illius entitatis, quae 
est ibi totaliter et perfecte". 
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by divinity; it cannot be itself"part" or have the "reason of a part" (rationem 
partis ). On account of not having either the reason of a part or the reason 
of a whole, the relation of origin or "paternity" cannot be finite or infinite, 
since all finite things have the "reason of a part", and the infinite essence 
has the "reason of a whole" (rationem totius ): "from the plenitude of its vir-
tual quantity" (ex plenitudine quantitatis uirtualis), namely, infinity in in-
tensity of entity, the infinite (the whole) measures every other being "as 
greater through the approximation, and less through the distance to it-
self"74. 
V. Mode of Being 
V.29 It is only after this "n,10dal description" of a being infinite in en-
tity, according to which infinity in entity is a proportion of intensity de-
scribed "through [undeterminable] excess" or "[undeterminable] superiority" 
(per excessum) in respect to what is measured or measurable in finite beings 
- namely their degree of intensity in entity - that Scotus chooses other 
words for ontological infinity and affirms, not that it is "proportion" in 
terms of "undeterminable excess or superiority of intensity in entity", but 
more simply that it is "infinity of intensity" or "intensive infinity" (inffnitas 
intensiva). To relate "intensive infinity" or "infinity of intensity" to a "be-
ing", calling it "infinite being", just as in Ord. Id. 8 p. 1 q. 3 n. 108-109 7'', 
(a) is not to speak of 'an attribute' (passio) that comes to it extrinsically 
(passio extrinseca adueniens), (b) nor to speak of something of a "being" in 
the manner of''convertible" transcendental properties such as "one", "true", 
and "good", which are formally a parte rei non-identical with "being", and 
(c) as we surely could infer (Scotus does not himself infer it here, but later 
does, calling it an 'attributable property' (proprietas attributali.s) 76 nor is it 
to speak of a 'pure perfection' (perfectio simpliciter) of being such as "wis-
dom" (sapientia) and "goodness" (bonitas). To relate "intensive infinity" or 
"infinity of intensity" to a being, calling it infinite being, is to say that it is 
an "intrinsic mode" of that entity or being (infinitas intensiua elicit moclum 
,., See Duns Scotus, Quaestiones quodlibetales q. 5 n. 126] 57 p, 199-200: "Hoc ergo 
volo habere, quod omne finitum, cum sit minus infinito, est pars; cui ergo repugnat esse 
pars, vel excecli realiter ab aliquo, ei repugnat esse finitum; nunc autem paternitati lrnis 
repugnat esse pars divinitatis illo modo, vel excedi a divinitate, quia propter infinitatem 
divinitatis paternitas, cum sit compossihilis sibi in eodem supposito, est simpliciter idem 
sibi; et, per consequens, realiter excedi non potest, nee esse pars, nee rationem partis 
habere potest. Non ergo est finita nee infinita, sicut prius probatum est, quia sicut 
finitum habet rationem partis modo praedicto, ita infinitum habet rationem totius hoc 
rnodo, scillcet ex plenitudine quantitatis virtualis suae mensurans omne a!iud ut maius 
per accessum ad i psum, et minus per recess um; sed nee paternitas ration em totalitatis, 
( ". )". 
"' See Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I cl. 8 p. 1 q. 3 n. 108-109 p, 202-203. 
"'In Onlinatio Id. 8 p. 1 q. 4 n. 162 p. 233, Scotus speaks of a 'pluralitas perfec-
tion um attributalium'. 
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intrinsecum illius entitatis) as it is conceivable on the basis of its nature 77• 
Scotus here explains 'modus intrinsecus' in terms of'intensio' or 'intentio' 18: 
the intensity in entity of a being is its intrinsic mode 79. Accordingly, it fol-
lows from (IP2) "An infinite in entity exists in actuality", or, assuming what 
was obtained before in (Cl), (C2), (C3), (C4), and (CS), i.e., "A perfect whole 
of being, with no intrinsic limitation and whose intensity in entity is infi-
nite or beyond any determinate or determinable degree of intensity in en-
tity among finite beings, exists"), that (C6) "There is a being whose intrinsic 
mode in entity is infinity". 
V.30 Let us call "P" the proposition "An infinite in entity exists in 
actuality" and "Qo" the proposition "There is a being whose intrinsic mode 
in entity is infinity" {Consequent 6 above). Then we have: 
1. ,OP (veritas naturaliter); 
2. P (positio impossibilis naturaliter); 
3. PA-,Qr; (Propositurn - denied because it is false; see III.6, III.14, IV. 
17-26, and V.29); 
4. -,(P A-.Q1,) (Propositum - conceded as following from the denial of 3); 
5. -,-,Q 1, (Propositwn - conceded as following from the admission of 2, 
and the concession of 4); 
6. Q11• 
'!'hen, by strict (necessary) implication, we arrive at 
7. If it is that P, then it is that Q(;, 
V.31 Having passed from intensity in entity to mode of being or of en-
tity, Scotus now explores the idea of"intrinsic mode" and its difference from 
"being"/"entity"; this exploration points to a distinction between "mode" and 
"attribute"/"perfection" concerning the way that the latter attaches to "be-
ing" or "entity". In what follows, it is plain that Scotus makes use of insights 
from Ordinatio Id. 8 p. 1 q. 3 n. 136-150. Accordingly, an intensity or an 
intrinsic mode is so intrinsic to a being that, ifwe abstract from all prop-
erties or quasi-properties of that being, we have not yet excluded, say, in-
finity from it, but it remains integrally included in that single entity itself. 
"Intrinsic" appears here as "inseparable', for something "separable" would 
77 See Quaestiones quodlibetales q. 5 n. !4] 10 p. 170: "Ex hoc sequitur quod infinitas 
intensiva non sic se habet ad ens, quod dicitur infinitum, tanquam quaedam passio 
extrinseca adveniens illi enti; nee etiam eo modo quo 'verum' et 'bonum' intelliguntur 
passiones vel proprietatis entis, imo infinitas intensiva <licit modum intrinsecum illius 
entitatis, ( ... )". 
7
" Scotus twice uses the word 'intensio' in Quaestiones quodlibetales q. 5 n. 1231 52 
p. 195, where it is contrasted to 'extensio'. We also find the synonym 'intentio' in other 
works; see, for example, Duns Scotus, Opera philosophica IV - Qua.estiones super lilu·os 
metaphysicorum Aristotelis Libri VI-IX, lib. VII q. 15 n. 20, Ed. R. Andrews et alii, 
Franciscan Institute Publications, St. Bonaventure (N. Y.), 1997, p. 301. 
w This is explained in more detail in: R. H. Pich, Infinity and Intrinsic Mode, op. 
cit., p. 210-215. 
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indeed be "extrinsic" 80• An intrinsic mode is not and cannot be formally dis-
tinguished from the being/nature of which it is a mode (as it would be dis-
tinguished in a distinctio formalis between two "realities" 81 ). Actually, as 
pointed out above, to conceive the entity itself under this mode is simply to 
apprehend it fully 82. Scotus affirms that if we consider that entity "most 
precisely" (praeeisissime accepta) - in itself and without any property - it 
will still be true to say that it has a "proper" or "intrinsic" "magnitude" 
(magnitudinem propriam) "of power" (virtutis) 83 • Scotus changes the de-
scriptive expressions, putting his discourse in more categorical terms; he 
makes sure that an infinite "being"/"entity" according to its nature has an 
"intrinsic magnitude" - comparable to an "intrinsic mode" and to a proper 
"intensity in entity" - that is "infinite", since its nature is incompatible with 
an "intrinsic magnitude" that is "finite". The language of"intensity", "mode" 
or "magnitude" of entity is intrinsic or proper, since it belongs entirely to the 
way the "entity" or "nature" is; the language of intensity, intrinsic mode or 
intrinsic magnitude admits fundamentally the degrees of infinity and 
finitys1. 
V.32 If Scotus says that a being or an entity "taken most precisely" has 
an "intrinsic magnitude" or an "intrinsic mode", he can now express what 
(only) "infinite" (infinitum) is, "considered most precisely" (praecisissime 
acceptum). He wants to describe in a more satisfactory way what an intrin-
sic mode or an intrinsic magnitude is, or at least what this intrinsic mode 
or intrinsic magnitude called "infinite" or "infinity" is. "To describe" is a 
correct expression here, for human beings have no full concept or under-
standing of a nature that shows what it is under the mode of infinity. We 
only have means for constructing a consistent concept of"infinite being" or 
"infinite entity", once we concede the positum (IP2) "An infinite in entity 
exists in actuality". Scotus wants to distinguish precisely infinitum from 
attributable properties - i.e., pure perfections, as indicated in V.29 - but 
this time he does not simply classify "infinite" as a mode of being/entity; he 
rather reconsiders it as an intensity in entity that has a degree/proportion 
and hence can be compared (comparari), according to an essential order of 
"
0 See G. Sondag, Jean de Damas et Jean Duns Scot sur l'infinite de !'essence di-
vine, op. cit., p. 312. 
"' See Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I d. 8 p. 1 q. 3 n. 139 p. 222-223. 
"" See above under IV.20 (note 53}; see Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I d. 8 p. 1 q. 3 n. 
138 p. 222. See also P. King, Scotus on Metaphysics, op. cit., p. 25-26. 
"'
1 Surely the expressions 'magnitudo propria', 'magnitudo intrinseca', 'modus pro-
prius', and 'modus intrinsecus' may be viewed as synonyms. See again R. H. Pich, In-
finity and Intrinsic Mode, op. cit., p. 210-214. 
"' See Duns Scotus, Quaestiones quodlibetales q. 5 n. 4 !10] p. 170: "(...), cuius est 
sic intrinsecum, quod circumscribendo quodlibet quod est proprietas vel quasi proprietas 
eius, adhuc infinitas eius non excluditur, sed includitur in ipsa entitate, quae est vnica. 
Vnde de ipsa entitate praecisissime accepta, absque scilicet quacumque proprietate, 
verum est dicere quod aliquam magnitudinem propriam virtutis habet sibi intrinsecam, 
et non magnitudinem finitam, quia ipsa repugnat sibi; ergo infinitam". 
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beings mentioned in IV.24, with things that it simply excels. Infinitum as 
intensity allows the degree/proportion of purely excelling any thing. 'Pure 
excelling' (my expression) is a relative expression that indicates that some-
thing "excels", "is superior" to something else, (i) not according to a degree/ 
proportion in any defined scale - else infinitum would be a finite degree or 
proportion in entity - but rather, we can infer, in a manner that is (ii) be-
yond any determinate or determinable degree 85. Such a final expression for 
"infinite" being or "infinity" in entity does not bring any new information, 
but allows that we clearly equate "intensity" and "intrinsic mode of being", 
for it follows from (IP2) "An infinite in entity exists in actuality" (v.rhen we 
assume what was obtained before in (Cl)-(C6)) that (C7) "There is a being 
whose degree of intensity in entity or whose intrinsic mode of being is be-
yond any determinate or determinable degree of intensity in entity or in-
trinsic mode of being among finite beings". 
V.33 Let us call "P" the proposition "An infinite in entity exists in 
actuality" and "Q/' the proposition "There is a being whose degree of inten-
sity in entity or whose intrinsic mode of being is beyond any determinate 
or determinable degree of intensity in entity or intrinsic mode of being 
among finite beings" (Consequent 7 above). Then we have: 
1. -,op (veritas naturaliter); 
2. P (positio impossibilis naturaliter); 
3. PA-.Q 7 (Propositum - denied because it is false; see III.6, III.14, IV. 
17-26, and V.29-32); 
4. -.(PA,Q1) (Propositum - conceded as following from the denial of3); 
5. -,,Q1 (Propositum - conceded as following from the admission of 2, 
and the concession of 4); 
6. Q1, 
Then, by strict (necessary) implication, we arrive at 
7. Ifit is that P, then it is that Q7• 
VI. Final Results of the impossibile positum 
VI.34 Scotus can now say directly what actual infinity is. This is no 
surprise; after all, he employed positio impossibilis for the purpose of form-
ing a concept of actual infinity, which he maintains is the concept of onto-
logical infinity alonf. If there was any doubt about the continuity of the 
positio when Scotus began the quidditative and modal descriptions (IV.19ff.), 
there is now a clear indication that the intended infinity receives its final 
""See Quaestiones quodlibetales q. 5 n. [4] 10 p. 170: "Ipsum etiam infinitum, 
praecisissime acceptum non sub aliqua rationc proprietatis attributalis ut bonitatis vel 
sapientiae, potest comparari secundum ordinem essentialem ad aliqua quae excedit, et 
non secundum aliquam proportionem determinatam, quia tune esset finitum; ( .. .Y'. 
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constitution only after the account of actual infinity obtained on the basis 
of Aristotle's potential infinite (see I.l-III.18) and the elucidation of the idea 
of mode of being/entity (see IV.22ff. and V.29ff.). Scotus affirms that "infin-
ity itself'' (ipsa infinitas) can be defined as the "intrinsic mode" of any in-
finite being in intensity or of any being which, because of its nature, is 
infinite in intensity. To be sure, some difficulties attend this passage in the 
Quodlibet 5; it suggests, for example, that we can think of infinity in terms 
of intrinsic mode and intensity so long as we keep in mind that infinity is 
a fundamental measure (analogous to quantity} in entity. However, at the 
same time, it maintains that «actual infinity» and "ontological infinity", in-
cluding a "modal" or even "quantitative" 8r; description, must be offered in 
terms of an entity or a nature that is infinite; its mode is attached to it in 
a way that admits no formal distinction between nature and mode 87• There 
is no way of constructing an acceptable concept of actual and ontological 
infinite save by combining quidditative and modal descriptions, To put the 
works of Scotus in perspective, we may observe that what is really new in 
Quodlibet 5 is, first, a quidditative description that has been built 8H care-
f1dl_y upon Aristotle's mathematical account of potential infinity and, sec-
ond, the clarification of a language of ontological modes that allows for the 
transfinite. Scotus masterfully summarizes these ideas by stating at the 
end of Quodl. 5 n. [4] 10 that "infinity" denotes intrinsically just that - i.e., 
an essence - (I) which lacks nothing (that is, nothing in entity, where we can 
read again the notions of strict whole and strict perfect) and (II) which, as 
entity and as attributes that have no intrinsic limitation, admits an inten-
sity (i.e., a mode or a magnitude of entity) that exceeds everything finite 
beyond every determinable proportion or degree (where we again read the 
terms of the modal description)m 1_ It thus follows from (IP2) "An infinite in 
entity exists in actuality" (assuming what was obtained before in (Cl)-(C7)), 
that (CS) "Ontological infinity cannot help but be (I) strict ,vhole and strict 
perfoct of entity and attributes of entity with no intrinsic limitation, and (II) 
an intrinsic mode, a magnitude of power or even an intensity in infinity, 
whose degree is purely excess". 
Vl.35 Finally, let us call "P" the proposition "An infinite in entity ex-
ists in actuality" and "Q8" the proposition "Ontological infinity cannot help 
but be (I) strict whole and strict perfect of entity and attributes of entity 
with no intrinsic limitation, and (II) an intrinsic mode, a magnitude of 
'
6 I deal with ontological "quantitative degrees" or with magnitudo!quantilcrn 
uirtutis and modus intrinsectts for essences or natures in another study; see R.H. Pich, 
Infinity and Intrinsic !v!ode, op. cit., p. 159-214. See alsD Orclinatio Id. 19 q. 1 n. 8, ed. 
Vat., vol. V, Civitas Vaticana, 1959, p. 267. 
"' See the references in notes 75, 76, 81, 82. 
88 Differently than in Duns Scotus, Ordinatio Id. 2 p. 1 q. 1·2 n, 132 p. 206-207 . 
. "" See Quaestiones quocllibetales q. ,5 n. [4110 p. 170-171: "( ... ); intrinsecus ergo 
modus cuiuslibet infiniti intensive est ipsa infinitas, quae intrinsece dicit ipsam esse cui 
nihil deest et quod excedit omne finitum ultra omnem proportionem determinabilem". 
POSITIO IMl'OSS/l3!LlS 1\ND CONCF:Fr l'OllMi\T!ON 75 
power or even an intensity in infinity, whose degree is purely excess» (Con-
sequent 8 above). Then we have: 
1. ,◊P ( veritas naturaliter ); 
2. P (positio impossibilis naturaliter); 
3. P1s--.Q8 (Propositwn - denied because it is false; see III.6, III.14, IV. 
17-26, and V.29-34); 
4. --lP1s-,QH) (Propositwn - conceded as following from the denial of3); 
5. -,--,Q 8 (Propositwn - conceded as following from the admission of 2, 
and the concession of 4); 
6. Q3. 
Then, by strict (necessary) implication, we arrive at 
7. If it is that P, then it is that Q8 • 
VI.36 It is worth noting that Scotus seems to treat the definition in 
VI.35, which he corroborates with an authority from ,John Damascene, as 
a corollary of ontological infinity; infinite being - or better an "essence" 
(essentia) that is infinite - is compared to an "infinite"/"endless" (infi_:nitwn) 
and "limitless"/"unlimited" (interrninatwn) "ocean of substance" (pelagus 
substantiae). As already pointed out, infinitum and interminatu.m 90 can be 
taken as synonymsH 1, At the same time, it seems warranted to interpret 
their uses - namely "limitless" and "limitlessness", as well as "infinite" and 
"infinity" of an essence - as expressing precisely the true idea of inftnitas 
in actu, an idea to be understood in terms of (I) strict whole and strict per-
fect in entity and (II) intensity or intrinsic mode under a degree of undeter-
minable measure. In this case, divine substance itself', as long as it has the 
structure of what is absolutely first in the divine reality, and is called an 
"ocean" by John Damascene, is "infinite and limitless" (infinita et intenni-
nata); it is exactly in this sense that an infinite being is the divine being or 
substance, and the concept of infinite being can work as the concept of the 
divine being or substance 92• Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that 
Duns Scotus makes use of the expressions inspired by John Damascene in 
order to confirm his thesis that in considering the substance understood 
(perfectly) as "infinite", he does not include any attributable properties such 
as truth, goodness, life, etc., but rather substance as such. For this reason, 
"infinity itself' (ipsa infinitas) or the notion of"infinity" as such and by it• 
"" For its part, 'interminatum' in Latin means the same as 'illimitatum'. 
"' See above under III.9. 
"'
1 And it is possibly because of the intended combination of quidditativc and modal 
aspects that Scotus hesitates between the expressions 'pelagus infinitum substantiae' 
(indeed found in ,John Damascene and here in Quodlibet 5) and 'pelagus infinitae sub-
stantiae' (as Scotus puts it in other contexts). Seo F. J. S. Catania, op. cit., pp. 47-48. 
See also Duns Scotus, Or·dinatio I d. 8 p. 1 q. 4 n. 198 p. 264: "Ista opinio confirmatur 
auctoritate Damasceni cap. 4 praeallegatn, et cap. 9, ubi ipse vult quod inter omnia 
nomina de Deo dicta, propriissimum est Qui est, quia esse <licit 'quoddam pelagus 
infinitae substantiae'; (. .. )". 
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self expresses an intrinsic mode of an essence more than an attribute of an 
essence; it expresses just how the essence is in what is intrinsically unlim-
ited within it 9:i_ 
VII. Conclusion: positio impossibilis and Concept Formation 
VII.37 Departing from this case study on the use of positio impossibi-
lis, it is time to conclude how positio itself and the ars obligatoria are to be 
understood for Scotus. Since the positio was employed both for the analy-
sis and the construction of the concept of infinite being as opposed to a con-
cept ofinfinite quantity, and in particular on the basis ofreasoning secundum 
imaginationem, I see no reason to compare what Scotus does either to an 
account of the ars in terms of the "counterfactual hypothesis" (P. V. Spade) 94 
or in terms of the "consistency game hypothesis" (C. Dutilh Novaes)9" - in-
terpretations that could find support in studies focused on logical treatises 
De obligationibus as the subjects ofinvestigation 96 • While I think that Ch. 
Martin's criticism of Spade's "would-conditionals" in favor of a "might-con-
ditionals" account (where the emphasis rests on the evaluation of the co-
tenability between propositions or the sense how anything com possible with 
the positum can be proved, or "might" be the case, if the positum were true) 
is sound and connects the ars to the construction of possible worlds by 
means similar to contemporary systems in modal logic:s97 , I am nevertheless 
"" See Quaestiones quodlibetales q. 5 n. [41 11 p. 171: "Et istud corollarium 
confirmatur per Damascenum cap. 7, ubi ipse vult quod essentia dicit pelagus substan-
tiae infinitum et interminatum. Substantia ergo, secundum quod habet rationem 
omnino primi in divinis et vocatur ab eo pelagus, sic ipsa est infinita et intenninata; sic 
autem non includitur in ea nee veritas, nee bonitas, nee a!iqua proprietas attributalis; 
ergo ipsa infinitas est magis modus intrinsecus essentiae, quam aliquod attributum". 
See also G. Sondag, Duns Scot. La metaphysique de la singularite, Vrin, Paris, 2005, p. 
115ff. 
"' See, for instance, P. V. Spade, Three Theories ofObligationes: Burley, Kilvington 
and Swyneshed on Counterfactual Reasoning, in: History and Philosophy of Logic, 3 
( 1982), p. 1-32. . 
"" Where obliga.tiones can sometimes be viewed (as in Roger Swyneshed's Obliga-
tiones) as a strategy for recognizing inferential relations between propositions - particu-
larly between the positum and the propositions proposed each time (see C. Dutilh 
Novaes, Roger Swyneshed's Obligationes: a Logical Game ofinference Recognition?, in: 
Synthese, 151:1 (2006), p. 125-153), but more fundamentally (as in Walter Burley's 
Obligationes) as "logical games of consistency" (see C. Dutilh Novaes, Medieval Obliga-
tiones as Logical Games of Consistency Maintenance, op. cit., p. 371-395). 
"" For surveys of the literature and the various interpretations of obligationes see 
C. Dutilh Novaes, Medieval Obligationes as Logical Games of Consistency Maintenance, 
op. cit., p. 373-376; Ch. Pi.itz, Die Obligationenlehre in der scholastischen Logz'k, 
Untersuchu11ge11 zum Einffo/3 der stoischen Logik auf die Lehre von den Verpflichtungen 
We obligationibus), Universitat Di.isseldorf, Di.isseldorf, 1997, p. 72-106. 
"
1 See Ch. J. Martin, Obligations and Liars, in: S. Read (ed.), Sophisms in Medi-
eval Logic and Grammar, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1992, p. 357-381. 
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inclined to agree, in respect of Scotus's positio, with M. Yrjl\nsuuri's expla• 
nation of obligationes as "thought experiments" 98. 
Vll.38 Understood as thought experiments 9 !l - as an assumption of a 
(counter)possible situation in order to learn from it "something applicable 
generally" 100 - ars obligatoria and particularly positio impossib ilis show no 
strong resemblance to classical counterfactual reasoning (i.e., D. Lewis's 
interpretation of the hypothetical conditiona1) 101• That being said, they must 
of course manifest consistency and agreement with logical rules. Our recon-
struction of Scotus's positio 102 makes this plain; moreover, we see in it a 
process of reasoning that starts from a situation contrary to natural poflsi• 
bilities, and yet without evidence of any need to remain as close as possible 
to the actual world. In this sense, counterfactual reasoning would not ap· 
pear to be fruitful for pure conceptual investigations, such as the study of 
the concept of ens infinitum, since in such investigations it is both permis• 
sible and necessary to depart as far as possible from the actual worldw:J_ 
Even though I cannot defend that this is generally true for a theory of ob-
ligations as a logical·technical exercise, 1 do think that it applies to Scotus 
in Quodlibet 5. 
VIl.39 At a minimum, the thought experiment at issue - the concep· 
tion of an actual infinite being grounded on a positio secundurn imaginatio-
nem - can be connected to aspects ("anachronistic" as they may be) of 
possible world semantics 1114, which is itself related to the analysis of modal 
concepts but also shows that logical possibilities can be used to conceive 
something and hence to construct concepts. At the root ofScotus's achieve-
"" See M. Yrjonsuuri, Obligations as Thought Experiments, in: I. Ange\elli and M. 
Cerezo (eds.), Studies on the Histo,y of Logic, \!/alter de Gruyter, Berlin, 1996, p. 93. I 
see no difficulty with maintaining that such an account coheres with the underlying 
notion of consistency maintenance for the exercises of positio. 
"'' Because it emphasizes conceivability and logical possibilities (see also below in 
the main text, M. Yrjonsuuri's account of obligationes, particularly of positiu impossi-
bilis), it can be seen as a "more epistemological version of Martin's idea tliat an obliga-
tional disputation mirrors the construction of a state of affairs (or a possible world)"; see 
C. Dutilh Novaes, Medieval Obligati'.ones as Logical Games of Consistency Maintenance, 
op. cit., p. 375. 
"'" See M. Yrjonsuuri, Obligations as Thought Experiments, op. cit., p. 85: "Obli-
gations are not of much value in terms of preparation to possible situations, neither in 
prospect of finding oneself in ethically problematic situations, nor in relation to appli-
cation of concepts of natural philosophy in practice. I believe that the anonymous au-
thor [of De arte obligatoria., Merton college ms. 306] rather had in mind the methodology 
of taking up oossible situations in order· to learn from them something applicable gen-
erally. This i'hethodology is nowadays called thought experiments". · 
"
11 See·D. Lewis, Counterfactuals, Oxford, Blackwell, 1973. 
"'" See paragraphs 15, 20, 23, 26, 30, 33, and 3.5. 
""' See M, Yrjonsuuri, Obligationes -14 th Century Logic of Disputation.a.! Duties, p. 
17, 174-176. 
"'
4 In his many studies, M. Yrjonsuuri works out this interpretation, especially in 
respect of Burley's Obligationes. 
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ment is the idea that the positio or possible proposition is false according 
to all we know, on the basis of the philosophy of nature, about reality or the 
actual world, although it can be true in some other situation ( i.e., in some 
other world}; I accept that a proposition is true in a world iff it signifies 
some state of affairs that obtains in the world. In this sense, Scotus would 
see (IPl) and (IP2) 10" as false and possible propositions belonging, say, to 
the actual world W of the disputation or the thought experiment, whereas 
he would see them as true and possible propositions belonging to another 
world. This is how a respondens, or Scotus himself in his own exercise, 
would think of the positio. If the positum in the terms of possible world 
semantics is a proposition about some world, not about the actual one (also 
because one cannot say that for all one knows about the world W, and even 
for all that can be naturally known about it, the positum is true at W), then 
the positum itself must be logically possible and conceivable - not some-
thing self-contradictory, but an opinabile. And so it can at least prim.a fa-
cie b~ rational1y accepted or thought of, in order for the respondens to see 
what follows from the assumption. This is equivalent to saying that the 
positio must be true in some imaginable world or worlds, which do not have 
to be possible in respect of the actual world. After all,"(. .. ) in conceptual and 
logical issues actual facts have no privilegGd status. Conceptually or logi-
cally possible states of affairs can serve as evidence just as actual facts" 10". 
I think this is exactly what happens when Scotus changes from "It is not 
possible, in actuality, that there is an infinite in quantity" (uerum natura· 
liter) to "Actually, there is an infinite in quantity" (i,npossibile naturaliter 
positum) in II.5 (the firstpositwn), and especially when he changes from "It 
is not possible, in actuality, that there is an infinite being" (ueru,n natura-
liter) to "Actually, there is an infinite in entity" (impossibile natu.raliter 
positum) in III.10 (the second positum); the assumption of a logically pos-
sible world constitutes an immediate admission of conceivability right at 
the start, although it is still necessary to follow from there (see further 
below) the stipulation of some consequents as "definitory" aspects or nec-
essary and sufficient conditions of a given complex conceptual assumption. 
VII.40 Scholars investigating primarily the nature of ars obligatoria, 
such as like M. Yrjonsuuri, recognize the potential of this technique of in-
ference, particularly in the form of positio impossibilis, to generate "some-
thing more interesting for philosophy" 10 '. If obligations can be used to 
speculate about a situation that is possible but not actual - or in Scotus's 
case about a situation that is at least naturally impossible to know as ac-
tual (which amounts to the same) - then it should come as no surprise that 
"''' See II.5 and IIL10 above. 
""' See M. Yrjonsuuri, Obligations as Thought Experiments, op. cit., p. 85. 
,,,., See M. Ytjonsuuri, The Role ofCasus in Some Fourteenth Centurv Treatises on 
Sophismata and Obligations, in: K. Jacobi (Hrsg..l,Argwnentationstheorie."Scholctstische 
F'orsclwngen zu den logisc/wn und semantischen Regeln lwrrekten Folgems, K J. Brill, 
Leiden, 1993, p. :120. 
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it was used in this way by jurists and natural philosophers in l4ll'-century; 
for his part, Scotus, we may infor, uses it for metaphysical purposes. And 
while we must admit that it is not always clear what should be understood 
by the "secundwn irnaginationem-method" of 14th-cEmtury natural philoso-
phers, Scotus's usage ofit confirms the hypothesis that the admission of a 
casus I positio is a central part of that method of analysis. As other philoso-
phers made use of casus I positio to analyze not exactly "physical truths" but 
"linguistic truths about physical concepts"lH8 - that is, to analyze what are 
not exactly "physical modalities" so much as the "conceptual modalities or 
the modality of possibility at different levels"Hm - I have myself no doubt 
that Scot us in Quodlibet 5 makes use of a positum not prirnari1y to illumine 
what is a metaphysical truth 110 but rather to illumine a linguistic or concep-
tual truth about a metaphysical concept: ens infinitum. 
VII.41 In this "metalinguistic" sense ofpositio irnpossibilis, the knowl-
edge that Scotus envisages is not about an existing thing but about a com-
plex concept signifying a thing. In the case study (see I-VI) this is most 
likely the practical purpose of the logic of obligations. In some of his stud-
ies, M. Yrjonsurri refers to an anonymous author 1:of De arte obligatoria, 
Merton college ms. 306] who suggests that obligations were also used in the 
linguistic analysis found more typically in the sophismata-literature, where 
for example physical concepts were clarified by obligational reasoning con-
nected to some casus. Scotus's thought experiment is an attempt to clarify 
the conceptual assumption of an actual infinity in the positum, investigat• 
ing then what that concept must possibly signify if it is meaningful at all 
- what must be true in all situations corresponding to the notion proposed 
in the positio - the actual infinite bei.ng. As I see it, Scotus's positio is re-
stricted to logical-semantical necessity; it concerns no natural necessities 
of the sort that are often ascribed to the role of casus in the sophismata. 
This may confirm the idea that the role of casus in sophismata literature 
helps to understand the development of the role of posit um in obligatio-
nes111. The original 'rei ueritas' assumption of casus - and the discussion of 
what must be true in situations fulfilling what the casus describes - finds 
an echo in the positio impossibilis naturaliter as a mere proposition, and not 
the things signified by it, which find themselves outside of the realm of 
known possibilities in nature. 
VII.42 The study of Scotus's positio in Quodlibet 5 conforms to the rule 
that whatever is entailed by the positum must be granted and that what-
""Id.ibid. 
imi Sec M. Yrjiinsuuri, The Com possibility of Impossibilities and Ars Obligatoria, 
in: History and Philosophy o/' Logic, 19 (1998), p. 243ff. 
11
" That there exists in actuality an inlinil.e being. 
'" See M. Yrjonsuuri, Tlw Role of'Casus in .Srm1e Fourteenth-Century Tn,afr,es on 
Sophisnwta ad Obligations, op. cit., p. ,'320-:121; Id., Obligations as Thought. Expm-imonl,, 
op. cit., p. 89-91. 
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ever is incompatible with the positum must be denied; the respondens must 
deny any proposition that is false in the world or worlds specified by the 
positum and what is pertinens to it. Accordingly, I think that the proposi-
tions formulated in the study as consequents (Cl)-(C8) are all "relevant 
propositions" 112, and, as emerges from the text, they were found to be con-
nected deductively to the worlds in which a positum like (IP2) is true only 
after careful (even "dialectical") examination. In order to formulate relevant 
proposita, and for the purpose of showing what it is to fulfill completely a 
positwn - and in so doing to construct exactly the complex concept put for-
ward in it - Scotus works very much with conceptual intuitions (such as 
'whole', 'perfect', 'complete', 'entity', 'intensity', 'intrinsic mode', 'iHimitation', 
etc.). This amounts to a kind of revision and at the same time expansion of 
a given positum. In this sense, in the finding ofrelevant proposita and con-
sequents, further concessions are involved and dialectically worked out. In 
contradistinction to what happens in counterfactual reasoning, such rel-
evant propositions do not describe but rather construct a possible situation 
- they construct a concept or show what its very conceivability is. This 
seems to justify and indeed to explain the use of 'ubi est possibilis' - that 
is, the recognition of the logical possibility ofcontentsm in III.16 (Qzwdl. 5 
n. [3] 8). After that locus, it is clear that the clause 'ubi est possibilis' rules 
over the entire (IP2), showing that it is actually possible to find out, after 
a careful search for the right terms and the right understanding of them, 
an acceptation of. consequents that reveal what belongs essentially to the 
antecedent. And this should justify the account of Impossibile Positum 2 to 
Consequents Cl-C8 as strict implications, revealing the logical-semantical 
necessity between antecedent and consequent. 
VII.43 What then is the difference between the lmpossibile Positum 
1 and the Impossibile Positum 2 - the first expressing some "subjunctive 
conditionalization", and the second a strict implication? Both may be seen 
as "thought experiments", and Scotus employs both of them by way of dis-
charging the duty of granting what was posited. But surely in the first 
"game", he cannot go farther than the two consequents (CI) and (C2); the 
technique has to end up there (see III.13). To be sure, the continuation of 
the exercise would demand the denial of the first positum; in other words, 
the second positum and its development make evident at the end - or ret-
rospectively.- that the first positum, although it can be mentally "enter-
11
• It would be correct to affinn that "irrelevant sentences", which are evaluated 
according to semantical considerations based on the actual situation, play no role in 
what Scotus does in Quodl. 5 n. 12-4] 5-11. Because the semantical background of the 
positum and of the irrelevant sentences would differ, it would difficult, from the perspec-
tive of contemporary discussions of such matters, to accept a "conditional" account of 
obligationes; after all, "no conditional makes sense with different semantics for the an-
tecedent and for the consequent"; see M. Yrjonsuuri, Obligations as Thought Experi-
ments, op. cit., p. 93-94. 
"" I.e., of actual infinity in entity. 
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tained" in a vague way and without apparent contradiction, nevertheless 
leads to contradiction and is itself inconsistent. As such, it is properly in-
conceivable. An actual infinite in quantity, insofar as it is not a strict whole 
and a strict perfect, must be classified retrospectively as a contradictio in 
adiecto, even if this contradiction is not apparent at a first glance. 
VII.44 The difference between (IPl) and (IP2) then would be not a dis-
tinct understanding of positio as a thought experiment and metalinguistic 
analysis (not even of the conditional of strict implication revealed by the 
examination of (IP2)). The idea is that, being by revision incapable of con-
ceivability, the first positum can at most be connected with the given 
proposita in a way similar to subjunctive reasoning. It is thus interpreted 
like a casus or a simple counterfactual assumption, and through (Cl) and 
(C2), there is an attempt to discover what would be true in the situation of 
(IPl). In a sense, (Cl) and (C2) would express necessary conditions for the 
satisfaction of parts of the elements of the posit um, h\1t by no means all 
necessary and sufficient conditions of its complex structure. As an intended 
positum, it is unfit to be investigated in an "imaginable world" since there 
cannot be an imaginable world for it in its entirety. Keeping the obligation 
in respect to the first positum, Scotus only finds a necessary condition: 
"There is an actual infinity in quantity, only if there is a whole and a per-
fect in the respective category'\ This is semantically acceptable. But the 
revision of the "necessary condition" achieved through the experiment de-
mands the beginning of a new game, or the discovery of a positum in which, 
in the indicative use of posse, a possible world is found indeed; in it, the 
complex content of the antecedent does work as a function for some value, 
VII.45 In conclusion, I offer two remarks on the idea of concept forma-
tion. Concept formation presupposes concepts, some of which may be 
simple, but most of which are surely non-simple. Scotus looks for a concept 
that is not obtained by abstraction but offers the basic meaning or structure 
for thinking of some thing, deitas, concerning which we, at least before a 
successful proof of its existence, do not know whether it exists or even in 
some minimal way what it is, and for which we have no more than a quid 
nominis. "Infinite being" as a concept is a conscious and artificial organi-
zation of thought which proceeds from intuitions characterized by general-
ity and vagueness (such as 'being' and 'infinite', respectively). As a result 
of intellectual effort, it should be understood not as a constitutive rule but 
as an ampliative and correcting rule of thought. To 'possess' a concept is dif-
ferent than to 'possess' a linguistic use for it of the sort we possess for 'in-
finite being'. Scotus surely admits conceptual analysis of linguistic uses and 
of intuitions, and this certainly can lead to revision and expansion, just as 
when we analyze "truth", "free will", "justice", etc. Concept formation pre-
supposes some constitutiveness (of'infinite' in terms of'whole' and 'perfect') 
and also creates some constitutiveness ( of 'actual infinite' in terms of 'whole' 
and 'perfect' with no intrinsic limitation). Scotus's concept formation 
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through positio impossibilis seems to follow linguistic use (say, in theology), 
whose origin is not necessarily revelation, and then proceeds to articulate 
clifforent general and vague notions such as "entity", "infinity", ''totality", 
"perfection", "illimitation", etc. Concept formation means examination and 
organization oflinguistic use and, of coursEJ, of some previous concept pos-
session. In this sense, concept formation is a constructive technique of con-
ceivability. What is it "to conceive" in accordance with the technique 
practiced above? It is to accept i.n thought what is thinkable - something 
not explicitly contradictory (the practitioner must only be able to accept it 
if he himself thinks it is not contradictory) -- even when we do not know 
whether it is or can he true, and even when we do not have true knmvledge 
of it. From there, it is to undertake an examination in order to see what 
follows, while (i) correcting or expanding what was conceded and (ii) estab-
lishing conditions for concessions and, in so doing, defining or forming a 
conception that we did not previously have. 
VIl.46 I do not know how to answer the question whether and in what 
measure concept formation can become concept. possession. I tend to think 
that the use of "imaginable worlds" in cases of positi'.o impo.c;sibilis brings 
Scotus near to modal-semantic analyses; I also tend to think that such con-
cepts are intensional entities. They could be a subject for formal accounts 
of the semantics ofa natural language in terms ofintensions, regarded as 
functions that map a possible world to the extension of the concept in that 
world (comparable to what was developed by philosophers such as D. K. 
Lewis, R. Montague, and R. Stalnaker). But that is a subject for another 
stucJyll1_ 
ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this study is to investigate Duns Scotus's uses of the technique 
of positio impossibilis for elaborating his concept of ens infinitum or ontological 
infinitas in Quodlibet. q. 5. Although there are several studies about Scotus's ac-
count of infinite being as a proper concept of God and of infinitum as the fundamen-
tal intrinsic mode of being, there is no targeted investigation of his conscious 
application of that logical tool for the purpose of concept formation. In order to 
acquire a complex concept like "infinite being", Scot.us is concerned first of all with 
the compatibility of its contents and with conceivability. He starts the technique 
exploring mathematical potential infinity according to Aristotle and arrives secun-
dum imaginationem at ontological actual infinity through the analysis of the no-
tions of "whole" (tot.um) and "perfection" (perfectuml. 
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